ELH

A Journal of English Literary History

VOLUME TWELVE JUNE, 1945 NUMBER TWO

CHAPMAN AND THE NATURE OF MAN

By ROY W. BATTENHOUSE

1

Study of Chapman's doctrine of man offers interesting illustration of one aspect of the sixteenth-century 'revival of the classics.' For Chapman's teachers were Plato, Plutarch, and Epictetus—along with such antiquarians as Comes and Ficinus; and steeping himself in these Hellenists, the poet acquired a nostalgia for the world of "old humanity." His models of virtue are Homer the mystic seer and Cato the serenely self-controlled. Christ upon the Cross is, indeed, also a hero—but a hero fitted to accord with Stoic and Platonic morality. Like the Florentine Platonists, Chapman is a syncretist of classical and Christian thought, assimilating the two in such a way as generally to blur over historical and theological distinctions. He makes his Cato argue, most un-Stoically, for the immortality of the soul, and even for a resurrection of the body; and, on the other hand, he has Christ propound the dubiously Christian doctrine that "As we are men, we death and hell controule."[1] Ranging Christian story side by side with pagan

[1] See *The Tragedy of Caesar and Pompey*, 5. 5. 123 ff. and 5. 2. 140 ff.; *A Hymne to Our Saviour*, 200. All references in this paper are to the plays as edited by T. M. Parrott (London, 1910-14) and the poems as edited by Phyllis Bartlett (Oxford University Press, 1941). Cato's argument for immortality, that the soul's powers must obtain that to which "they are in nature's aim directed,"

myth, Chapman interprets both in terms of Plotinian philosophy.[2] In this respect he represents a recrudescence of that "religion" of Classicism which Athanasius and Augustine had with difficulty conquered. The religious concepts of Hellenistic philosophy rather than the definitions of Christian orthodoxy furnish Chapman the premises of his view of man.

The distinction is an important one; and to see it clearly it will be profitable to recall quickly a few of the points particularly urged by the two Church Fathers just mentioned. Philosophic wisdom, Augustine had remarked in his 13th Book *On the Trinity*, enables men not to be blessed but to be "bravely miserable." Unable to be what they would wish, they counsel themselves to will only what they can—thus binding themselves under "nature" rather than freeing themselves under God. They desire immortality, for such is implied in the universal will to be blessed, but they fail to see that immortality is for "the whole man, who certainly consists of soul and body." This insistence on the integrity of the whole man, and on his genuine freedom within the realm of nature, is what distinguishes Augustine and Athanasius from their Classical opponents.

Equally important is Christianity's emphasis on the essential goodness of the created world. Against Arius, whose intellectual affiliations were Neoplatonic, Athanasius declares that the world has not been made, as Plato teaches, by some mere mechanic out of a pre-existent stuff, but by a genuine Creator, out of nothing;[3] and hence evil does not reside in matter but in the perverted choice of the soul which has shut its eyes against God.[4] Arius must be instructed on this point: that our Lord's putting on of human flesh in no way disqualified him for equal status with God the Father, for the Son "was

is actually a statement of the "appetite argument" as formulated by Ficinus; and Cato's affirmation, allegorized out of Homer, that the soul has power to "hoist this earthly body up" to heaven when "fined by death" is also in agreement with Ficinus, who supports his reasoning by reference to a myth in Plato's *Politicus*. See Paul O. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 195-96, and Ch. 15, pp. 340 ff.

[2] See my *Marlowe's Tamburlaine: A Study in Renaissance Moral Philosophy* (Vanderbilt University Press, 1941), pp. 75-77.

[3] *On the Incarnation*, 2-3.

[4] *Against the Heathen*, 6-7.

not lessened by the envelopment of the body, but rather deified it and rendered it immortal." [5] Augustine, a century and a half later, is equally careful to establish the point that "in its own kind and degree the flesh is good." He censures the Manichees for detesting our present bodies, and the Platonists for holding the view that the diseases of desire which affect the soul arise from the soul's association with an earthly body. A Christian, he says, does "not desire to be deprived of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality." [6] The Platonists, though we may call them the wisest among the philosophers of antiquity, were yet blinded by the absence of two fundamental doctrines: that of the Incarnation and that of the Resurrection of the Body.[7]

With this necessarily very brief account of the important points of cleavage between Christian and Classical thought as it bears on the problem of the nature and destiny of man, I turn now to an examination of Chapman's views.

2

Let us give attention, first, to the constitution of man as Chapman conceives him. The words of the "Senecal" Clermont as he stands on the threshold of deifying himself by suicide are generally supposed, I think, to represent the dramatist's own view. Clermont says:

> The garment or the cover of the mind,
> The human soul is; of the soul, the spirit
> The proper robe is; of the spirit, the blood;
> And of the blood, the body is the shroud.
> With that must I begin then to unclothe,
> And come at th' other.[8]

The picture here is of "layers" of being, increasingly material and crude in nature, encasing and imprisoning an intellectual being whose homeland is "beyond." Plainly, the body is not viewed as good, nor is the soul the "form of the body" as for Aristotle and St. Thomas; instead, man is a Neoplatonic spirit

[5] *Defense of the Nicene Definition*, 3. 14.
[6] *City of God*, 14. 3-5.
[7] See *Confessions*, 7. 14; *City of God*, 8. 5-8; 22. 26-28.
[8] *The Revenge of Bussy D'Ambois*. 5. 5. 170-75.

imbedded uncomfortably in nature. The interpretation is made the more vivid in certain of Chapman's non-dramatic verses, where man's soul is spoken of as a ray from heaven dwelling in a dunghill body; or again, man's flesh is said to be a Shirt of Nessus.[9] In *Eugenia* man is defined as "all mind," the body being merely the mind's "instrument."[10] The body's "passionate affects," we are told in *Andromeda*, never can display satisfactorily "what the soul respects"—just as the shadow of a man "never can Shew the distinct, the exact Forme of Man"

> For how can mortall things, immortal shew?
> Or that which false is, represent the trew?[11]

In Chapman's tragedies the characters repeatedly elaborate this depreciatory view of the body. "Our bodies," says Tamyra, "are but thick clouds to our souls, Through which they cannot shine when they desire."[12] The Guise, in a speech justifying suicide, calls his body "this imperfect blood and flesh," "this mass of slavery," "this same sink of sensuality," "this carrion"; and he determines to "set my true man clear" by springing up to the stars![13] Byron blames his ultimate misery on the "bond and bundle of corruption" to which his soul is linked. "I know this body but a sink of folly," he says. At the same time Epernon, an onlooker, exclaims over the "impossible mixtures" of "corruption and eternnesse" of which man consists.[14]

The sources for Chapman's negative view of the body obvi-

[9] See *The Teares of Peace*, 981 ff. (cf. *De Guiana*, 81), and *Eugenia*, 828. A gloss of *Eugenia*, 702 ff. explains the soul as an "infusion" from God; *A Coronet for his Mistresse Philosophie*, stanza 3, describes her mind as "the beame of God." Similarly Neoplatonic is Cato's explanation in *The Tragedy of Caesar and Pompey*, 1. 1. 78-79, that a good man's goodness is a "beam" proceeding from the goodness of the gods.

[10] Lines 633-34.

[11] *Andromeda Liberata*, 63-68. Bartlett points out that the doctrine, taken by Chapman from Ficinus, is elaborated also in *A Hymne to Our Saviour*, 221-48. Note that line 205 of this latter poem defines the human soul as a "mortal celestiall"— implying that man is essentially a divinity but handicapped by mortality.

[12] *Bussy D'Ambois*, 3. 1. 78-79.

[13] *Revenge of Bussy*, 5. 4. 7-19.

[14] *Byron's Tragedy*, 5. 4. 32 and 5. 3. 189-91. With Epernon's comments compare those of the "Chorus Sacerdotum" in Fulke Greville's *Mustapha*.

ously go back as far as Pythagoras' suggestion that the body is a prison-house, Plato's theory that it is at best a 'principle of limitation,' and Plutarch's picture of it as a mere 'receptacle' susceptible of affection and mutation.[15] But Chapman could have encountered the same views closer at hand. From Ficinus he might have learned that man's "immortal soul is always miserable in the body," and from Landinus that life on earth participates in gloom and perturbation because tied to matter.[16] Abraham Fraunce stood ready to tell him that

> The *Platonists* call the body a *Hell*, in respect of the minde . . . for, being bereaft of celestial ornaments, it sorroweth and greeueth, and therefore compast with Stygian waues, displeaseth itselfe, hateth and abhoreth his owne acts, howles, and makes pitiful lamentation; and that is *Cocytus*, of κοκέυω, to howle and crie out, as Plato expoundeth it.[17]

Among Chapman's own English contemporaries Sir John Davies was speaking of man's body as a prison, and Davies of Hereford was calling it a "Clog."[18]

Chapman's view of the world parallels his view of man, for they are related as macrocosm to microcosm.[19] As body is to soul, so earth is to heaven a shadow as compared with substance. Felicity is definitely not to be found on earth. "Hath any man been blessed, and yet liv'd?" Byron asks.[20] And Pompey wonders "did the state Of any best man here associate?"[21] It is wisdom, he thinks, "to turn one's back to all the world, And only look at heaven."[22] Athenodorus concurs: "for this giant world," he says

> Let's not contend with it, when heaven itself
> Fails to reform it: why should we affect
> The least hand over it in that ambition?

---

[15] See Charles N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford, 1940), esp. pp. 79-80, 169-71.

[16] See Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 135-38; also Kristeller, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

[17] *The Third part of the Countesse of Pembrokes Yuychurch* (1592), fol. 28r.

[18] See my *Marlowe's Tamburlaine*, p. 96.

[19] See, e. g., *Eugenia*, 723, and *Andromeda*, 129.

[20] *Byron's Conspiracy*, 1. 2. 26.

[21] *Caesar and Pompey*, 4. 3. 80-81.

[22] *Ibid.*, 5. 1. 216-217.

> A heap 'tis of digested villany;
> Virtue in labour with eternal chaos
> Press'd to a living death, and rack'd beneath it.[23]

Cato, joining the chorus of scorn, prepares for suicide with the words: "The next world and my soul, then, let me serve."[24] As for this world, Chapman's wisemen agree in condemning it as a realm of infirmity and change, depravity and flux: not until man is "above All motion" can he be "fix'd and quiet."[25] Such a view, let me point out, implies that time has significance only as a Platonic "moving image of eternity," and history no meaning but as a period of exile.

3

Having thus made clear the way in which Chapman construes the character of the world and of man, let us now explore its implications. What is the destiny of man, assuming a definition of his nature in Neoplatonic terms? Here Chapman enters on complex territory and paradoxical answers. The multiple aspects of his answer can perhaps best be disentangled in terms of several classical myths which have a key prominence in his thinking. Particularly worth examining are the myths of Ganymede, Prometheus, the 'Senecal man,' and Hercules. Each exhibits a part of Chapman's view as to the destiny of man.

The myth of Ganymede, as interpreted by Renaissance allegorists, teaches that man's most glorious destiny is to be found in the cultivation of his intellect. According to Comes and Landinus, Ganymede stands for the human mind, beloved by the Supreme Being, and abducted from the body by the "divine fury" of enraptured contemplation.[26] Abraham Fraunce explains that the ravishing of Ganymede by Jupiter stands for "the lifting up of mans minde from these earthly toyes, to

[23] *Ibid.*, 5. 2. 76-82.

[24] *Ibid.*, 5. 2. 131.

[25] *Ibid.*, 5. 1. 195-96; cf. *Eugenia*, 467 ff. Note that the gloss here in *Eugenia*, as well as Demetrius' speeches in *Caesar and Pompey*, 5. 1. 130 ff., argue that virtue is incompatible with greatness in the world—thus anticipating Mandeville's celebrated paradox in *The Fable of the Bees*. See also the poem *A Great Man*, 1-2 and gloss.

[26] See Panofsky, pp. 214-15.

heauenly conceipts." [27] The destiny here held out for man is that he may transcend the realm of misery associated with his body and earthly life and be caught up into the beatitude of heaven, if he will but concentrate his activity in the exercise of his intellect, disregarding the lure of the senses. Chapman employs the myth thus in his *Hymnus in Cynthiam*. The sense-world, he there argues, is but a shadow of the real world: it is, to use his phrase, only a " Shadow of Night " obscuring the true Divine Dark in which man, if he be virtuous, can come to dwell like a bright star. Ganymede was snatched out of earth's noisome gloom and stellified as the great Aquarius in heaven's healthful dark, because he cultivated intellectual beauty. His story teaches that the mind " nearest comes to a Divinity " when it " furtherest is from spot of Earth's delight." To be carried off by the Eagle of contemplation is to become a shining light of virtue. Chapman, believing this with all his heart, regarded scholarship as a " holy trance " and an avenue to saving truth; unless it was that, it was worthless. What he sought in Homer was a " flood of soul " and those " doctrinal illations of truth " which might conduct him, and other readers, to a peace passing all understanding.[28]

But Platonic and Stoic thought has to face the fact also that man is earth-bound. He has a term to spend in the world of flux or nature. Even though his true and proper destiny be to rest in eternity as a Plotinian pure spirit, or to ascend to the fiery heavens as a spark of Stoic logos, yet the economy of the universe has imposed on him a period of struggle in the world. His plight is symbolized by the wrestling Jacob [29] or, more commonly, by the figure of Prometheus. As Prometheus was bound to a pillar, says Abraham Fraunce, so " The minde is bound fast to the body, and there chained for awhile "; and the Eagle which devoured Prometheus' heart stands for the meditations which every day consume the wiseman's mind—which only the night (of contemplation?) can restore again.[30]

Erwin Panofsky has pointed out that the agonizing Prometheus was a favorite symbol in Renaissance art, expressing the price mankind has to pay for its intellectual awakening—

[27] *Op. cit.*, fol. 33r.
[28] See *Teares of Peace.*
[29] See *Eugenia*, 608-09 and gloss.
[30] *Op. cit.*, fol. 9v.

the price of being tortured by profound meditation, and recovering only to be tortured again.[31] Chapman seems to express this mood in some verses addressed to his friend Harriot:

> O that my strange muse
> Without this bodies nourishment could vse,
> Her zealous faculties, onely t' aspire,
> Instructiue light from your whole Sphere of fire:
> But woe is me, what zeale or power soeuer
> My free soule hath, my body will be neuer
> Able t' attend.

His soul's " genuine formes," he says, " struggle for birth, Vnder the clawes of this fowle Panther earth "; for his body is constantly betraying its " crown," the soul.[32] Like Prometheus, Chapman is ill at ease in the terrestrial order; but he believes, as a passage in *The Shadow of Night* indicates, that a " Promethean " poet serves his fellowmen by making them likewise ill at ease. His task is to picture the subhuman character of their degenerate lives, thus illuminating their predicament and stirring them up to reform.[33] Further, Chapman says elsewhere, poetry has a " Promethean facultie " to " create men." [34] Here he would seem to be reflecting the notion, popularized in the Renaissance by Boccaccio, that man is not fully " created " until given spiritual Form by the culture-bringer Prometheus.[35] At any rate, such interpretation accords closely with Chapman's theory that man is incomplete unless ruled by " soul," and that the soul itself is " a blank " until " informed " by Learning or Art:

> So when the Soule is to the body giuen;
> (Being substance of Gods image, sent from heaven)
> It is not his true Image, till it take

---

[31] *Op. cit.*, pp. 50-51. Elsewhere Panofsky remarks that Prometheus was " a favorite humanistic symbol of the artist " and Hercules " a favorite humanistic symbol of man in general." See his " Renaissance and Renascences," *Kenyon Review*, 6 (Spring, 1944), 233.

[32] *To Harriots*, 19-20, 31-37, 45-46. Compare *Byron's Conspiracy*, 3. 3. 9 ff., where La Brosse complains that knowledge is " wretched " because in " making our ends eternity . . . we are plagued."

[33] *Hymnus in Noctem*, 131 and gloss.

[34] *To Prince Henrie*, 137.

[35] See my *Marlowe's Tamburlaine*, p. 79n.

> Into the Substance, those fit forms that make
> His perfect Image; which are then imprest
> By Learning and impulsion.[36]

Poetry, in Chapman's view, is the mediator of this Learning, the conveyor of this Art. So also was Christ, who endured pains to bring about the "perfecting" of the form infused in man's creation.[37] Chapman's Christ is, in other words, a Promethean poet; and Chapman's self-dedication to Christ is an embracing of the rôle of suffering light-bringer.[38]

4

In accord with his understanding of man's misery and of the poet's instructional function, Chapman composed tragedies in which the protagonists are moral types.[39] They represent in the main two forms of human nature: the degenerate and the ideal. That is, Chapman's heroes are either slaves-of-passion or exemplars of calm. In the first category come Byron, Bussy, and Tamyra—"headless" and headlong men and women; in the second we find Clermont the "complete" man and Cato his double. The one series illustrates what Chapman calls "the body's fervour"; the other, "the mind's constant and unconquered empire."

These two categories, supposed by Chapman to derive from Homer, actually reflect Neoplatonic theory as to the two divergent courses in life open to man.[40] A man's destiny, accord-

[36] *Teares of Peace*, 352 ff.; cf. *Eugenia*, 953 ff. and 1152-59.

[37] *A Hymne to our Saviour*, 135-36.

[38] As illustration of the pervasiveness of the Prometheus theme, note the title of a work by T.-A. D'Aubigné in 1616: *LES TRAGIQUES donner au Public par le larcin de Prométhée.*

[39] James Smith in his "George Chapman," *Scrutiny*, 4 (1935), 61, points out that the dramatist tells us very little about the physical appearance of his characters and fails to distinguish them by their speech. "Chapman, having decided that his characters are primarily moral beings, confines them as much as possible to the moral world."

[40] See Kristeller, pp. 357-59. Pleasure and wisdom are the two opposite courses. Sometimes, however, Ficinus spoke of three forms of life—the contemplative, the active, and the voluptuous—represented by the ancient poets under the figures of Minerva, Juno, and Venus. Paris chose Venus; Hercules, Juno; and Socrates, Minerva. Of these three, the active life (chosen by Hercules) is regarded by Ficinus as the farthest removed from the goal of man, because of its restlessness; the voluptuous life is closer; the contemplative life is closest. This is important to bear in mind in studying the Hercules myth, which I shall discuss below.

ing to this theory, is determined by whether he rests in reason or gives rein to passion; by whether he trusts in things inward or covets things outward. He may, to use Chapman's language, "direct Reason in such an Art, as that it can Turne blood to soule, and make both, one calme man," [41] or he may let his thoughts take fire from his blood, become enamoured like Narcissus of his shadow-self, and progressively drown himself in his own lower nature. Either he will use the soul's "beams" to disperse the body's vapors, or the body will be allowed to choke the soul.[42] In giving pattern to these antithetical careers Chapman invokes two myths of opposite purport: that of the "Senecal man" and that of Hercules.

Analysis of the Senecal man need not detain us long. He is a static figure, essentially undramatic. Cato is at his height in declaring

> I'll pursue my reason,
> And hold that as my light and fiery pillar [43]

or when he is raising such queries as

> is not our free soul infus'd
> To every body in her absolute end
> To rule that body? . . .
> And being empress, may she not dispose
> It, and the life in it, at her just pleasure? [44]

But his acting in accord with such logic makes of tragic catharsis a mockery. To put a sword to one's own heart and cry "Now I am safe" is to deny the value of all history and make all heroism a pompous prelude to retreat. Cato is a tedious character parading an immobile virtue. His drama, being all character and no plot, is decidedly unAristotelian.

Clermont's principles are equally 'correct,' and his demise equally insipid. He is a protagonist "fix'd in himself," with a "most gentle and unwearied mind, Rightly to virtue fram'd." [45] We are told also that he has the "crown of man," which is "learning," to supplement and rule his natural valor. This means that he wisely abhors all those things which a merely

[41] *Teares of Peace*, 557-59.
[42] *Teares of Peace*, 986-90; *De Guiana*, 106.
[43] *Caesar and Pompey*, 5. 2. 42-43.
[44] *Ibid.*, 4. 5. 74-79.
[45] *Revenge of Bussy*, 4. 4. 14-15, 46.

'natural' man like Byron glories in—change, violence, perjury, self-seeking, and outward greatness. For he has learned from Homer's story of Achilles that men endowed with nature's best gifts can come to destruction unless they set down "Decrees within them, for disposing these." [46] Wisely he understands nature "with enough art" and therefore sees the Universe as a divine frame which it would be gross impiety to attempt to subject to his private will: instead, he will go "cheek by cheek" with Necessity in "glad obedience To any thing the high and general Cause . . . hath ordain'd." [47] So, when he is arrested unjustly he resigns himself philosophically; when a "Christian" ghost lets him know that God ordains the revenge of Bussy, he obeys; and when the laws of Platonic friendship urge him to join the slain Guise, he again complies. He is a curious mixture of Christian, Stoic, and Platonic morality. He commits suicide like a Stoic, but he fulfills an act of vengeance which, as several commentators have pointed out,[48] no Stoic would have considered worth performing.

But let us now examine the alternative explanation of human tragedy set forth in Bussy and Byron. A. S. Ferguson is the latest of several commentators to agree in the statement that Bussy is for the dramatist "the classical Hercules born anew, accomplishing similar feats, and lured to a similar tragic doom." [49] Bussy is a hero committed to the pursuit of virtue but betrayed by his "great heart [that] will not down." His passion, though ardently set on "honest actions," is presently serving the black-magic of the Friar [50] and the adulterous will of Tamyra. His valor declares itself in the Herculean pattern when he offers himself as a cleanser of the court and is given by the King the rôle of scourge. Bussy has, however, what one of his epithets announces, a "Passion of death!", and we

[46] *Ibid.*, 3. 4. 14-20.

[47] *Ibid.*, 4. 1. 131 ff.

[48] E. g., U. M. Ellis-Fermor, *The Jacobean Drama* (London, 1936), p. 69; R. H. Perkinson, "Nature and the Tragic Hero in Chapman's Bussy Plays," *MLQ*, 3. 275.

[49] See "The Plays of George Chapman," *MLR*, 13 (1918), 10, citing with approval Professors Boas and Parrott.

[50] Chapman, as his *A Hymne to Our Saviour* shows, was particularly infuriated by hypocrisy in Churchmen. In *Bussy* he attributes a "worldly" philosophy to the stock figure of the Friar-magician (borrowed from Greene) and then voices what is no doubt his own moral indignation at the Friar through the speech of Monsieur, 5. 1. 163-72.

watch him trapped into death by the call of Tamyra's blood. He then meets his fate with the fortitude of a Hercules—chastened, however, by his Shirt-of-Nessus experience into an astonishing piety of quasi-Christian tone. The ending is quite un-Senecan when Bussy forgives his enemies, acknowledges his own "worthless fall," and proclaims his fate a warning to express the "frail condition of strength, valour, [and] virtue." If we ask what Bussy's tragic flaw was, there is the hint of an answer in the words of Monsieur, who tells us that Bussy is "like other naturals That have strange gifts in nature, but no soul Diffus'd quite through." [51] Or we may explain it as the Guise does in *The Revenge of Bussy*, a play written six years later: Bussy's valor, he says, lacked "learning," so that he "was rapt with outrage oftentimes Beyond decorum." [52]

The pattern is similar, but more elaborately moralized, in the Byron plays. Byron, like Marlowe's Tamburlaine, thinks it "immortality to die aspiring"; he wants to be "like the shaft Shot at the sun by angry Hercules." [53] Like Hercules and Bussy, he is a man of valor with great accomplishments: he has "Alcides-like gone under th' earth, And on these shoulders borne the weight of France." [54] But he is a man "broken loose From human limits," who is easily "taken in affection" by the black-magic of La Fin, as Bussy was by that of the Friar. Indeed, Byron attempts later to excuse his crime by blaming it on "this damn'd enchanter," but one of his judges replies that "worthy minds witchcraft can never force." The Prologue explains Byron's tragedy as a yielding to "policy," so that he thirsts no longer for his country's love but Narcissus-like for "the fair shades of himself." There is reference, at the beginning of the second play, to the "fatal thirst of his ambition" which is carrying Byron "quite against the stream of all religion, Honour, and reason." A Shirt-of-Nessus overtakes him in the form of an inward fire arising from "adust and melancholy choler" of the blood and issuing in hysteria.[55] His virtue has now degenerated into a kind of

[51] *Bussy*, 3. 2. 435-37. Note that he is called "The man of blood" in 3. 2. 373.
[52] 2. 1. 89-90.
[53] *Byron's Conspiracy*, 1. 2. 31 and 40-41.
[54] *Byron's Tragedy*, 3. 1. 151-52.
[55] See *Byron's Conspiracy*, 2. 2. 43. and 5. 2. 83-84; *Byron's Tragedy*, 5. 2. 296-98, and 5. 3. 207-09.

Machiavellian virtù; so that Soissons is right in remarking "O Virtue, thou art now far worse than Fortune." Another observer, the Vidame, sees the true meaning of "this angry conflagration": it is a purgatorial fire blasting Byron's earthly hopes so that "piety [may] enter with her willing cross." Presently piety begins to appear, phoenix-like, out of the ashes, as Byron asks

> Why should I keep my soul in this dark light,
> Whose black beams lighted me to lose myself? [56]

The play's protagonist has become a chastened moralizer by the time he says

> Farewell, world!
> He is at no end of his actions blest
> Whose ends will make him greatest, and not best; [57]

and he ends the play like a preacher:

> Fall on your knees then, statists, ere ye fall,
> That you may rise again: knees bent too late,
> Stick you in earth like statues: see in me
> How you are pour'd down from your clearest heavens.

Significantly, Byron now regards death as an "eternal victory" by which his soul is freed to take her flight. Such an ending is quite in line with the Neoplatonic interpretation of Hercules' pyre as a burning of the dross of mortality by which he purged himself to become divine.[58] More importantly, the ending agrees with a long tradition of "homiletical tragedy," from W. Wager to John Ford, in which the "chain of vice" theme and the "scaffold speech" are standard features.[59]

Chapman's way of ending the Bussy and Byron dramas depends on the paradoxical theory that a display of evil for-

[56] *Byron's Tragedy*, 5. 4. 69-70. Compare *Bussy D'Ambois*, 5. 4. 134-40, where Bussy laments too late that the *sun* of his life, Tamyra, is now turned into blood, in which he feels his life dissolving away into the ocean of flux.

[57] *Byron's Tragedy*, 5. 4. 143-45. Note the antithesis of "greatest" and "best" and compare *supra*, footnote 25.

[58] So Ficinus had interpreted in his Preface to Plato's *Symposium*. And so also Abraham Fraunce, *op. cit.*, fol. 47r: "At length . . . he burnt himselfe on the mount *Oeta*: that is to say, his terrestrial body being purged and purified, himselfe was afterwards deified and crowned with immortality."

[59] See the excellent survey in Henry H. Adams, *English Domestic or Homiletic Tragedy, 1575-1642* (Columbia University Press, 1943), esp. pp. 82, 118-22.

wards the good. The fire in Byron, says the King, "not another deluge can put out"; [60] consequently we see it putting itself out by exhaustion so that Byron can be reborn—and so that others may be converted by the awful spectable. The view accords closely with that set forth in *The Shadow of Night*. The world of the senses, the poet there says, is a great smoking altar of human passions which must either be drowned by the deluge of our tears or cleansed by the fury of a Hercules; "lust's fire" must either be quenched by intellectual love or expended in hot and noisy pursuits whose miseries may beget contrition. "Weepe, weepe your soules, into felicitie," says Chapman, for sorrow is the only way to beatitude. In other words, if we do not embrace religion through repentance we will be driven to it through grievous "justice" and fiery trial.

5

The view we have just discriminated implies an apology for violence in the name of piety, and is one of the most curious and significant aspects of the thought of the Jacobean age. I wish there were space here to develop adequately the close parallel of Chapman's theory with that of Fulke Greville, who deciphers his own name as "Greiv-Ill" because of his gloomy view of life.[61] According to Greville, the flesh must die before grace can be born; "The earth must burne, ere we for Christ can looke." [62]

> For God comes not till man be ouerthrowne;
> Peace is the seed of grace, in dead flesh sowne.[63]
>
> God meant not Man should here inherit,
> A *time-made* World, which with time should not fade;
> But as *Noes flood* once drown'd woods, hils, & plain,
> So should the fire of *Christ* waste all againe.[64]
> First let the law plough vp thy wicked heart
> That *Christ* may come, and all these types depart.[65]

In other words, man is a rebel who must be broken by the law before he will look for grace—must feel the hot fires of justice

[60] *Byron's Conspiracy*, 5. 2. 83-84.
[61] See *Caelica*, 83. I cite from G. Bullough's edition of *The Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1939).
[62] *Caelica*, 89.
[63] *Caelica*, 96.
[64] *A Treatie of Warres*, stanza 48.
[65] *Caelica*, 88.

in his own world and his own blood before he will welcome the cool of God's firmament and of Christ's red blood streaming. Our "falne nature," says Greville, follows "streames of vanity" until "Forc'd vp to call for grace":

> Whence from the depth of fatall desolation
> Springs vp the height of his [man's] Regeneration.[66]

For

> When Gods All-might doth in thy flesh appeare,
> Then Seas with streames aboue thy skye doe meet.[67]

Here is a hope indeed Promethean, creating (if I may quote Shelley) "From its own wreck the thing it contemplates." It makes capital out of despair, since it has lost contact with the Christian hope set forth in the Incarnation.

What is particularly worth noting, I think, is that in Greville's world view, as in Chapman's, we find parading under the same banner of piety both idealism and cynicism, a theoretical humanitarianism and "pacifism" side by side with a practical approval of violence [68]—a combination such as characterized politics in the late Roman empire, and is not wholly absent among our contemporaries. There is in Greville, as Miss Ellis-Fermor has lately pointed out, a curious crossing of a "hard vein of Machiavellian pragmatism with the almost mystical rejection of the seen in favor of the unseen." [69] "Proceed in Furie," Achmat says in *Mustapha*, for "Furie hath Law and Reason, Where it doth plague the wickedness of Treason." And again: "Nothing [is] thy way vnto eternall being; Death, to saluation; and the Graue to Heauen." [70] This may be compared with Chapman's advice to the Furies in *The Shadow of Night* to

> Thunder your wrongs, your miseries and hells,
> And with the dismall accents of your knells,
> Reuiue the dead, and make the liuing dye
> In ruth, and terror of your torturie.

---

[66] *Caelica*, 96.

[67] *Caelica*, 88.

[68] For a discussion of this dualism in Greville, see Bullough's Introduction, esp. pp. 14-15; for its presence in Shelley, see Carl Grabo, *The Meaning of the Witch of Atlas* (Chapel Hill, 1935), p. 112, where it is traced to Neoplatonic sources.

[69] U. M. Ellis-Fermor, *The Jacobean Drama* (London, 1936), p. 194.

[70] *Mustapha*, 5. 3. 96; and "Chorus Quintus," lines 19-20.

and with his invocation, in the name of justice:

> Fall Hercules from heauen in tempestes hurld,
> And cleanse this beastly stable of the world.[71]

Chapman's Bussy and Byron both think of themselves as "scourges" and seem to receive from Chapman a kind of justification in the rôle, as if their violence, for all its intemperance, were being accommodated by Necessity to a providential function.[72] Byron, who has brought France peace and made his own name glorious as "Scourge of the Huguenots,"[73] gives this justification for extending his activities as scourge:

> The world is quite inverted, Virtue thrown
> At Vice's feet, and sensual Peace confounds
> Valour and cowardice, fame and infamy;
> The rude and terrible age is turn'd again,
> . . . . . .
> We must reform and have a new creation
> Of state and government, and on our Chaos
> Will I sit brooding up another world.
> I, who through all the dangers that can siege
> The life of man, have forc'd my glorious way
> To the repairing of my country's ruins,
> Will ruin it again to re-advance it.[74]

That these are indeed an aspect of Chapman's own sentiments is made clear if we compare passages in the non-dramatic *Shadow of Night*: for there we find the notion that man is in a degenerate Iron age of "sensual" peace, that he wallows in a moral chaos from which it would be blessed to return to the physical chaos of "the old essence and insensive prime," and that torture advances this cure of man's diseases. The conclusion we must draw, if I interpret aright, is that such Herculean figures as Bussy and Byron advance morality even while illus-

[71] Lines 306-09 and 255-56. Compare *Eugenia*, 1123-31. See also my "Chapman's *The Shadow of Night*: An Interpretation," *SP*, 38 (1941), esp. pp. 593-96 and 604.

[72] Chapman has "Lyncean Pompey" declare that "The gods inflict on men diseases never . . . but to decipher . . . some rude vice within them: And why . . . but to make Men note, and shun, and tax it to th' extreme?" (*Caesar and Pompey*, 1. 2. 260-64). For a comparison with Marlowe's thought, see my "Tamburlaine, The 'Scourge of God,'" *PMLA*, 56 (1941), 337-48.

[73] The title is twice pointed out: *Byron's Tragedy*, 1. 3. 3, and 5. 1. 79.

[74] *Byron's Tragedy*, 1. 2. 14-17, 29-35.

trating depravity, for in their scourging of others and eventually of themselves they teach all men to despise our life in time and covet a " second life " in eternity.

Chapman and Greville can make room at the same time for transcendentalism and Machiavellianism because they have received from Platonic teachers a " two-story universe " and a two-story man. From Ficinus had come the doctrine that man is created " double " with two " lights," one innate and the other infused, and two " loves," one Profane and the other Sacred.[75] This means a bifurcation of man between his secular or " natural " life, which is under Fate, and his divine or rational life, which is under Providence. It means that man " in nature " only is " fallen " and miserable. For nature is of itself irrational[76] and needs constantly to be rationalized. " What nature gives at random," says Chapman, must be ordered by our " divine part." [77] Or again, Chapman regarded Nature as " at her heart corrupted . . . euen in her most ennobled birth," so that " she must neede incitements to her good "; [78] left to herself, she is brutish for lack of Reason.[79] By this perspective Chapman could declare through Monsieur in *Bussy* that " Nature is stark blind herself." But at the same time he could say through the Guise that Nature does not actually work " at random," however it may seem so to the superficial eye.[80] Nature has, indeed, an end: her own dissolution. The man who serves her is like the sea, destined to bristle with surges until " crown'd with his own quiet foam." Nature, in other words, is continually wasting herself by an inner law of defection. Greville was to see in this very fact of nature's failure a pious purpose:

> Nature herselfe, doth her own selfe defloure,
> To hate those errors she her selfe doth giue.
> For how should man thinke that, he may not doe
> If Nature did not faile, and punish too? [81]

[75] See Nesca A. Robb, *Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance* (London, 1935), pp. 79-83.
[76] See Kristeller's quotation, p. 370, of Ficinus on this point.
[77] *An Anagram on Henry*, 6-10.
[78] See *De Guiana*, 117-23.
[79] See *Andromeda Liberata*, dedicatory lines *To Sommerset*, 129-44.
[80] See *Bussy D'Ambois*, 5. 2. 4 and 21 ff.
[81] *Mustapha*, Chorus Sacerdotum, 9-12.

Nature, let us take note, teaches negatively, warning man to flee from her to God.

The logic of Chapman and Greville is thus the logic of despair, moving dialectically from nature to grace—nature being understood in more or less Machiavellian terms, and grace being equated with Platonic and Stoic idealism. Between these two opposites lies a chasm, and there is no reconciling principle. Nature and "fallen man" are considered so depraved, the world and the times so out of joint, that only violence can effect a cure. Chapman's Clermont, who is supposed to be the very opposite of "your Machiavellian villains," [82] nevertheless sanctions violence:

> When truth is overthrown, his laws corrupted;
> When souls are smother'd in the flatter'd flesh,
> Slain bodies are no more than oxen slain;

and he excuses the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre:

> Had Faith and true Religion been preferr'd
> Religious Guise had never massacred.[83]

On the other hand, Chapman seems to sanction also the violence of passion which causes religious duty to be overturned and souls to be smothered. Tamyra in *Bussy D'Ambois* says her offence is forced upon her by "urgent necessity" and by the "strong finger" which nature has in each of us.[84] The Friar backs her up with the doctrine that "our affections' storm, Rais'd in our blood, no reason can reform." [85] The dramatist presents us thus with two contradictory attitudes: on the one hand, Clermont's ruthlessness toward the body, since it is so bound up with our corruption and "fall"; and, on the other hand, Tamyra's indulgent excusing of the body's fervors, since passion is natural to life in "this world." [86] Puritan rigorism and libertine laxness are the respective horns of this dilemma. It represents, as any historian will recognize,

[82] *Revenge of Bussy*, 4. 4. 49.
[83] *Revenge of Bussy*, 2. 1. 217-19 and 233-34.
[84] *Bussy D'Ambois*, 3. 1. 61-67.
[85] *Bussy D'Ambois*, 2. 2. 140-41.
[86] Compare Chapman's attitude in the "fall" of the virtuous Cynthia in *The Widow's Tears*; he is ruthless toward her in the speeches of Lysander but cynically excuses such "lust" in the speeches of Demetrius and in the ending given to the play. Contrast Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*.

a revival of the well-known " paradoxes " of ancient Gnosticism and Manicheeism. The root-cause is a pessimistic view of the world, well expressed by the Ghost in *Bussy* when he says that misery is " the just curse of our abus'd creation, Which wee must suffer heere and scape heereafter." [87]

On one side of his thinking, therefore, Chapman has much in common with Machiavelli. For Machiavelli, as Pierre Mesnard has said, has a " pessimisme décidé et résolu, aussi bien pour l'individu que pour L'Etat." [88] This is because Machiavelli, like Chapman, makes a sharp distinction between the cosmos, represented by the starry heavens, an invariable and eternal realm, and our lower world, which is suspended from the heavens and participates only imperfectly in their inflexible harmony. Our earthly globe, according to Machiavelli, is determined in the mass. Its total energy, physical and moral, given once and for all, remains constant; but its aspects vary incessantly. History is nothing else than the succession of transformations of detail which inform differently this malleable matter including man. Force, industry, virtue—all is submitted to the same laws of evolution and dissolution. Man is prey to a persistent mobility. If he lets himself go, submitting to nature's influences, he accelerates the perpetual process of disintegration; and he is always inclined to do this, because matter has put in him the germ of instability which makes him desire change. Nature has endowed him with a desire for all things, while fortune permits him to attain only a few, with the result that there is in the human heart a perpetual discontent. The task of government is to restrain and guide this discontent, to collaborate with fortune and limit its effects—as a man might prepare dikes to limit the ravages of flood.

Chapman's belief in the indomitability of passion when once aroused, and his acquiescence in a necessitarian view of nature's processes, puts him in close accord with Machiavelli. He can deny the Florentine's logic, therefore, only by a leap of faith, in which Machiavellianism is allowed a dialectical status

[87] *Bussy D'Ambois*, 5. 4. 15 ff., reading in 1607 quarto.

[88] *L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Siècle* (Paris, 1936), p. 19. My paragraph, from here on, rests on translation and paraphrase from Mesnard, pp. 19-21.

as one aspect of the truth, requiring constantly to be transcended by mystical idealism. Chapman's heroes "overcome" nature by leaving it behind. They either stay aloof, with Clermont, until forced to flee nature's challenge by suicide; or they submit to nature's cycle, with Byron, until dissolution fits them for piety's wings. The trouble with Chapman's world view is that, having accepted a description of nature in line with Machiavelli's, he can avoid Machiavelli's principles only by avoiding nature, by repudiating wholesale the world of observed fact. In so far as he is compelled to take this world of evil into account, he knows no way of dealing with it except in terms of a "natural law" which is Machiavellian.

6

The point that deserves stressing is the radical difference between such a version of human nature and destiny and the Christian version. Christian theory agrees with Aristotle in believing that man has some chance for happiness in this world. Chapman, on the other hand, reverts to Senecan theory, which believes man sure to be outwardly beaten, since worldly calamity is irresistible and inescapable. Chapman's Bussy, as Hardin Craig has lately said, is no Aristotelian protagonist but a Senecan titan.[89] Seneca, say Craig,

> proposed to build up something within the heart of man which would enable him to gain a pyrrhic victory over fate. This doctrine is inherent in the stories of Hercules and Prometheus.[90]

Since I have in this paper given considerable attention to these stories, let me add merely that the reader who wants to pursue further the significance of their cleavage from Christian story will find illuminating commentary in Charles N. Cochrane's recent book. Professor Cochrane describes the history of Classical Culture's warfare with Christianity as a long contest tween two kinds of faith—the Promethean and the Trinitarian.[91] Promethean faith, Cochrane explains, is built on the

[89] See "The Shackling of Accidents: A Study of Elizabethan Tragedy," *PQ*, 19 (1940), 1-19.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[91] *Op. cit.*, pp. 368, 410-14.

notion of an opposition between man and his environment; between " character " and " circumstance "; between " virtue " and " necessity " or " chance." The prospect here held out for man is that of an endless struggle for the supremacy of mind over matter so long as the soul is " in the body "; while " beyond " there is release for the mind from all that is susceptible of death and destruction.[92] Trinitarian faith, on the other hand, denies any antithesis between human liberty and natural necessity. It affirms that God has created both man and nature, between whom there is no necessary opposition, since nature is not a closed system determined by its own laws. Prometheus therefore is but the victim of his own obsessions. He is self-frustrated.[93] I would suggest that the mental agonies of the Promethean Chapman might be thus largely explained.

Chapman's man, if I may now summarize, is split by the Platonic dichotomy between sense and intellect. He is by constitution half mortal and half celestial, with a body in nature and a soul from God. Through the sense world he is enmeshed in the tumults of fate, while through the intellectual world providence opens a path to peace. Destined to God as his ideal end, man must yet accommodate to nature, master it so long and so far as possible, but failing this, take from nature's very gifts a precious bane. Thus man's destiny may be multiple: by aspiration a Ganymede enrapt in the ecstasy of contemplation; by intention a Senecal man ruling his earthly activities through reason; by default a Hercules chastening the world and himself through passion; and by necessity a Prometheus agonizing after transcendence. Such interpretation means introducing the settled melancholy of the Classical perspective in place of Christianity's sober cheer.

Vanderbilt University

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-71
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 411.

THE MERIT OF METAPHYSICAL STYLE IN DONNE'S EASTER SERMONS

By Herbert H. Umbach

In the Renaissance a metaphysical kind or style of sermon and preaching existed, exactly as did the metaphysical manner of writing songs and sonnets. When John Donne was ordained in 1615 at the age of forty-three, his earlier tendency toward such expression was not forgotten; rather, this style was molded by him to a new purpose. As Chudleigh's elegy on Donne's death says:

> He kept his loves, but not his objects; wit
> He did not banish, but transplanted it,
> Taught it his place and use, and brought it home
> To Pietie, which it doth best become.

1

The word *wit* is here used in our sense of *metaphysical*, applied to preachers as Dryden and Johnson applied it to certain poets and as Grierson in *Metaphysical Lyrics and Poems* interprets it. Compared with the conceits of the Elizabethans, such wit is more intellectual, often less verbal, in its peculiar blend of passion and thought, of feeling and ratiocination. The best definition is given by W. Fraser Mitchell in the introductory chapter of *English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson*, a Study of its Literary Aspects:

> When, therefore, we speak of preaching as "metaphysical," we mean that it is quaint and fantastic, not because it employs unusual or whimsical expressions or images, but that when it does employ such it derives them from a background of remote learning, and adapts them to use by a curious transmutation effected by means of the peculiar temperament or deliberate endeavour of the preacher. In short, "metaphysical" defines precisely the form which "witty" preaching took in England in the early seventeenth century.

Particularly in the Established Church (*via media Anglicana*) at this time there were metaphysical sermons by the following prominent Anglo-Catholic divines: Lancelot Andrewes,

William Laud, Ralph Brownrig, John Hackett, Richard Corbet, Henry King, Thomas Playfere, John Cosin, Mark Frank, and John Donne. This trend was reflected in the sermons of other religious groups, among those Anglican preachers who stood apart from the Laudian movement because of Puritan or rational or other considerations, or among those whose main work either fell within the period directly before the triumph of Arminianism or who, while dissociating themselves from the ecclesiastical policy which formed one of the chief incentives to the civil wars, yet remained loyal to episcopacy and to the broad traditions of Catholic doctrine. Even in the Roman Catholic group in England the metaphysical vogue existed. But the real movement proper is found in the Anglo-Catholic fold, as the evidence of surviving manuscript and printed sermons of this interesting century reveals. Mitchell's bibliography lists the still available works of 398 different divines, many of whose sermons I have read and found metaphysical.

The devices of Euphuism influenced sacred oratory in England after they had lost their hold on polite letters, and were in use at the peak of Donne's sermon productivity. Witty preaching of the baser sort, which was closely allied to and often consisted in quips and wordplay, boasted a lineage which can be traced back definitely to the closing years of Elizabeth's reign. At that time Thomas Playfere, then Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Cambridge University, gave solemn countenance to the fashion. Certainly Lancelot Andrewes, who was to become the favorite court preacher of James I, became the great example of metaphysical sermonizing and was widely imitated.

The history of metaphysical sermons, however, begins on the European continent. Adapted to the needs and uses of the pulpit, the conceit and its by-products were regarded as the work of Spain, where earliest examples are found. Later in France, Germany, and England the Italians were credited with originating the new style, similar to the Italian earliest use of the sonnet technique. Indeed, the practice seems to have become current elsewhere before its first great Spanish exponent, the court preacher Paravicino, had printed a single sermon. A general metaphysical movement had many endorsers through-

out Europe: Italy had Azzolini, Aresi, and Giuglaris; France had André and Garasse; Germany had Santa Clara and Cober; Spain had Paravicino (whom Lope de Vega hailed as her Cyril and Chrysostom combined); and England had the many preachers already indicated. Treatises explaining the *concetto predicabile* and the *conception théologique* soon appeared, and compilations of appropriate similes, etc., were published. Humanistic gravity and eloquence were ignored by the extremists.

A natural reaction followed everywhere, aimed at homiletic reform in the general crusade for purification of language. Famous attacks on pulpit eloquence were John Wilkins' *Ecclesiastes, a Discourse concerning the Gift of Preaching, as it falls under the Rules of Art*, 1646; John Eachard's *The Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion enquired into*, 1670; and Joseph Glanvill's *An Essay concerning Preaching*, 1670. A relative simplicity gradually returned also to the pulpit, in consequence. The scholarly studies on this topic by J. E. Spingarn, Morris W. Croll, and Richard Foster Jones are well known; yet none of these critics presents a detailed analysis of the metaphysical elements in the sermons of the most literary preacher in the group. My essay, accordingly, shows specifically where Donne is metaphysical as a preacher and that, considered in the context of his times, his sermons have the merit of not being extremely metaphysical for one so gifted in thought and expression.

2

From the approximately 160 of Donne's sermons which have survived in manuscript and in print I select the eleven [1] Easter

[1] Two further sermons appear to belong here, but internal evidence to the contrary rules them out. LXXX, 75, "Preached to the King at White-Hall, April 15, 1628," is a special or occasional sermon. Its delivery on Easter Tuesday did not influence its content. Also, XXVI, 14, is obviously a continuation of XXVI, 13 (dated April 19, 1618, which was the second Sunday after Easter), because it is called "A Second Sermon Preached at White-Hall," and because reference is made in it to the preceding one. Its date, April 2, 1621, i. e. Easter Monday, is probably incorrect. Would Donne have reminded his hearers of a detail in a sermon preached *three* years earlier? Appendix B in Evelyn Simpson's *A Study of the Prose Works of John Donne* suggests that either of the two dates is erroneous. Because of the paucity of the Easter motif in XXVI, 14, I conclude that this sermon is mis-dated.

In typewritten form to date, I have worked out a complete edition of Donne's

sermons. Not one of this cycle survived in manuscript, nor appeared in print before 1640; and in 1640 the stylistic reform had not yet gained momentum! Though posthumously published by John Donne, Jr., ten of the eleven had the advantage of at least a partial supervision by the Dean himself, who is known to have been busy in the closing years of his life preparing for the press what materialized into the LXXX or first folio (1640). The *L* or second folio (1649) had no Easter sermon. One Easter sermon, the longest of the group, was added to the previous ten when the third and final folio, XXVI (1660), appeared. The complete, chronological list reads, with Easter Sunday the customary day:

1. 1619 (?), LXXX, 27, on Psalm 89, verse 48.
2. 1622 (?), LXXX, 26, on I Thessalonians 4, verse 17.
3. 1622 Easter Monday, XXVI, 25, on II Corinthians 4, verse 6.
4. 1623, LXXX, 18, on Acts 2, verse 36.
5. 1624, LXXX, 19, on Revelation 20, verse 6.
6. 1625, LXXX, 20, on John 5, verses 28 and 29.
7. 1626, LXXX, 21, on I Corinthians 15, verse 29.
8. 1627, LXXX, 22, on Hebrews 11, verse 35.
9. 1628, LXXX, 23, on I Corinthians 13, verse 12.
10. 1629, LXXX, 24, on Job 4, verse 18.
11. 1630, LXXX, 25, on Matthew 28, verse 6.

Having been prepared for an annual festival occasion and for a holiday audience assembled in (usually) a great London cathedral, these sermons best represent the mature Dean of St. Paul's whom I consider a preacher who had something to say—rather than a clergyman who had to say something. Keep in mind that Donne was not an extremist (as was e. g. Andrewes) among metaphysical preachers; and remember that the following examples, because they necessarily are presented apart from their full context, may appear more overwrought than actually they are.

For convenient classification and for clarity, I shall divide the plethora of illustrative material into the five principal units

Easter Sermons from the original texts and with folio collation of all important later reprints. For a discussion of possibly pertinent differences between a spoken and a printed sermon, between a sermon as preached and a sermon as written by Donne, see my "The Rhetoric of Donne's Sermons," *PMLA*, 52 (1937). 354-358. Cf. also Don Cameron Allen's "Dean Donne Sets His Text," *ELH*, 10 (1943). 208-229.

used singly or collectively by seventeenth century critics. Briefly, these are: a partiality for strange and unexpected figures of rhetoric; an ingenious straining after wit; an attaching of exaggerated importance to particular words and phrases; a parading of authorities and sources with learned paraphrases; and an elaboration of outline divisions. Such charges are appropriately lodged against even today's extremer sermons. When applied to Donne, such claims do not give sufficient credit to a rhetorical effectiveness fostered by the results of centuries of discussion of such necessary composition factors as *inventio* (which embraces consideration of the text, division, and explanation of the passage), *dispositio* (which consists of amplification—together with explanation, this forms the body of the sermon—and application), and *exornatio* (which may be achieved by sheer simplicity, by wealth of language, by special arrangement, or by figures of speech). Donne's homiletic method regularly includes:

1. Analysis, in minute detail, of the natural parts of the texts;
2. Illustration of each step in the resolution with arguments and proof texts, frequently in Latin, culled from patristic and scholastic writers almost as much as from the Bible itself;
3. Reconstruction of the anatomy, with practical application.

The total effect is coherent and pleasing.

3

The first characteristic of metaphysical sermon style is its frequent use of strange figures of rhetoric, in what Donne himself labeled "the learned manner of preaching." Collections of appropriate similes and metaphors, calculated to assist beginners, were procurable. Outstanding among such manuals, and later mentioned by Eachard as the chief storehouse of similitudes for English sermons, were *Apophthegmatum sive Responsorum Memorabilium Loci Communes*, 1555, and *Parabolae seu Similitudines*, 1557, both compiled by the German Lycosthenes, i. e. Conrad Wolffhart.

Figures had received relatively little space in classical rhetoric, but later treatises tended to elaborate and classify above all else *figurae verborum* and *figurae sententiarum* until in

post-classical and mediaeval rhetoric little else was really discussed. The result of applying these principles to the sermon is strikingly evident in mediaeval preaching, in which the dominance of logic deviated many sermons into over-analysis bulwarked by troops and schematic patterns.[2]

In the sixteenth century the humanistic movement and the contentions of the Reformation were responsible for the differentiation of preaching from ordinary oratory, and compelled recognition of the fact that, although it was a rhetorical study, it should be motivated by its singular content and by the peculiar aim of its professors. As Dargan says in *A History of Preaching*, the gains of the Reformation still visible in the sermons of the seventeenth century were, in Protestant preaching, chiefly the place given to the exposition of Scripture and to the polemic against Rome. Nevertheless, at the universities in Donne's time there was no provision for formal training in sermon-making as an art, although a professorship of Divinity had existed at both Cambridge and Oxford since the time of Henry VIII. Yet, because of the prevailing method of instruction in both secondary and higher education, the young B. D. would have had fairly regular practice in public speaking, if not in composition. Use of similitudes was taken for granted in literature, and was defended in a natural way for sermons because Christ had effectively used parables. To make up your own imagery, untaught by school methods and assisted only by the available compends and by your own imagination, became the rage. The most important point seems to have been overlooked, namely that Jesus' parables recall the more familiar occupations or circumstances in life. Metaphysical figures are based largely on unfamiliarity or strangeness or subtlety or ingenuity.

I have tabulated more than 275 different figures, images, similitudes, and illustration suggestions in Donne's Easter sermons, many of which occur more than once. A large per-

[2] See Harry Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching," *Classical Phil.*, 28 (1933). 73-96; Mary Paton Ramsay, *Les Doctrines Médiévales Chez Donne*; J. M. Neale, *Mediaeval Preachers and Mediaeval Preaching*; S. Baring-Gould, *Post-Mediaeval Preachers*; Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*; and G. R. Owst, *Preaching in Medieval England*, and *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*.

centage is ordinary and hence not quoteworthy here. The following examples are characteristic, but far from grotesque. The way to heaven is sketched as having other than the regular approach, even as another way to the Moluccas or to China than by the promontory of Good Hope opened itself to Magellan. Bodily illness in catarrhs and rheums and dropsies and such distillations is a flood, whereas sickness in fevers and frenzies and such conflagrations is a fire. As Christ has nailed to the cross His handwriting (our bond with our signature) which He had against us and thereby has cancelled His evidence, so in His descent into hell and in His subsequent acts of glorification He has burnt His library (of recorded loans made to us). God's omniscience and omnipresence are so perfect that, as Ambrose points out, even if a religiously wise man had Gyges' ring for invisibility and might sin invisibly before men, he would be seen by God. Christ is our zodiac in Whom we move from the beginning to the end of our circle, of which circle the first point is our adoption by Christ and the last point is our resurrection. Preaching is the thunder that clears the air, dispersing all clouds of ignorance, and the Sacrament of the Altar is the lightning, the glorious light and presence of Christ Himself. A leviathan, a whale from a grain of spawn, or an oak from a buried acorn is indeed a great change; but a great world out of nothing is verily a stranger improvement. In heaven we shall not pass from author to author as in grammar school, nor from art to art as in a university; but as that general did who knighted his whole army, God shall create us all doctors in a minute. At the end of the world I shall in an instant know more than all the books of God's creatures [3]

[3] In "A Query on Donne's Sermon XXX, Folio of 1640," A. C. Howell in *N & Q*, 161 (1931). 156-157, shows that one of the common conventions of Renaissance thinking is that which speaks of "the Book of God's Word" and "the Book of God's Works," this pair being found frequently in Donne's writings and in Bacon's (e. g. *The Advancement of Learning*, Book I). Donne sometimes adds "the Book of Man's Conscience," thus forming a triad echoed in Owen Felltham's *Resolves* (second ed. 1628), number 168. Howell says: "Did Donne read the *Resolves*, as well he might; or did Felltham hear the learned Doctor, as undoubtedly he did; or did both get their triad of books about God from a sermon convention going back to some venerable Father of the Church?"

In the *Essays in Divinity* (ed. 1657, p. 4 ff.) Donne compares the Bible with God's other books, such as the Book of Life, knowledge of which is sealed from man, and the Book of Creatures or Nature, of which Donne quotes the opinion of

could reveal to me, not only as already I know that a bee-hive, that an ant-hill is the same book in *decimo sexto* as a kingdom is in *folio*, and that a flower which lives but a day is an abridgement of that king who lives out his threescore and ten years.

To reveal the rhythm and sentence structure of such figurative language to best advantage, I present in Donne's actual words a few apt quotations from different contexts in the Easter sermons,[4] with his rhetorical punctuation.

But when the Church was newly conceived, and then lay like the egge of a Dove, and a Gyants foot over it, like a worm, like an ant, and hill upon hill whelmed upon it, nay, like a grain of corn between the upper and lower Mill-stone, ground to dust between Tyrans and Heretiques, when as she bled in her Cradle, in those children whom *Herod* slew, so she bled upon her crutches, in those decrepit men whom former persecutions and tortures had creepled before, when East and West joyned hands to crush her, and hands, and brains, joyned execution to consultation to annihilate her; in this wane of the Moon God gave her an instant fulnesse; in this exinanition, instant glory; in this grave, an instant Resurrection.

In the generall resurrection upon naturall death, God shall work upon this dispersion of our scattered dust, as in the first fall, which is the Divorce, by way of Re-union, and in the second, which is Putrifaction, by way of Re-efformation; so in this third, which is Dispersion, by way of Re-collection; where mans buried flesh hath brought forth grasse, and that grasse fed beasts, and those beasts fed men, and those men fed other men, God that knowes in which Boxe of his Cabinet all this seed Pearle lies, in what corner of the world every atome, every graine of every mans dust sleeps, shall recollect that dust, and then recompact that body, and then reinanimate that man, and that is the accomplishment of all.

Raymond of Sabund whose great work, *Liber Naturae sive Creaturarum*, declared that the Book of Nature and the Bible were each divine revelations, the one general and the other specific.

Cf. LXXX, 80, p. 823: "The world is a great Volume, and man the Index of that Book," and L, 36, p. 327: ". . . the booke of nature, this world. . . ." In the eleven Easter sermons alone, this book figure appears ten times. I have analyzed this one example in detail to suggest what should be carried further in investigating imagery in Donne's sermons. Cf. Milton Allan Rugoff's *Donne's Imagery* and Caroline Spurgeon's *Shakespeare's Imagery and What It Tells Us.*

[4] These passages will illustrate also the four remaining points discussed later. Reprinted in *Donne's Sermons, Selected Passages*, ed. Logan Pearsall Smith, and in *John Donne, Complete Poetry and Selected Prose*, ed. John Hayward, these quotations are taken from LXXX, 19, pp. 185 and 186; *ibid.*, 21, p. 212; *ibid.*, 23, p. 226; and *ibid.*, 27, p. 267. For a representative list of Donne's sermon figures in general, see Intro., p. 11 of *A Book of Seventeenth-Century Prose*, ed. Coffin and Witherspoon.

There is not so poore a creature but may be thy glasse to see God in. The greatest flat glasse that can be made, cannot represent any thing greater than it is: If every gnat that flies were an Archangell, all that could but tell me, that there is a God; and the poorest worme that creeps, tells me that. If I should aske the Basilisk, how camest thou by those killing eyes, he would tell me, Thy God made me so; And if I should ask the Slow-worme, how camest thou to be without eyes, he would tell me, Thy God made me so. The Cedar is no better a glasse to see God in, than the Hyssope upon the wall; all things that are, are equally removed from being nothing; and whatsoever hath any beeing, is by that very beeing, a glasse in which we see God, who is the roote, and the fountaine of all beeing. The whole frame of nature is the Theatre, the whole Volume of creatures is the glasse, and the light of nature, reason, is our light, which is another Circumstance.

Wee are all conceived in close Prison; in our Mothers wombes, we are close Prisoners all; when we are borne, we are borne but to the liberty of the house; Prisoners still, though within larger walls; and then all our life is but a going out to the place of Execution, to death. Now was there ever any man seen to sleep in the Cart, between New-gate, and Tyborne? between the Prison, and the place of Execution, does any man sleep? And we sleep all the way; from the womb to the grave we are never throughly awake; but passe on with such dreames, and imaginations as these, I may live as well, as another, and why should I dye, rather than another? but awake, and tell me, sayes this text, *Quis Homo?* who is that other that thou talkest of? *What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death?*

Much of this elaboration of figurative diction can be traced back to the allegoric method of interpretation fostered by the reconciliation of Christianity with Platonism. Use of the multiple senses of Scripture, beloved of Philo, Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine, and expounded as a homiletic principle by Aquinas, was beginning to go out of vogue in the early seventeenth century especially with the Puritans. Metaphysical finding of various meanings in Bible texts was being superseded by the plain, historical exegesis which already in the preceding century Colet had introduced into his treatment of the Pauline epistles. So hard had allegorical hermeneutics been pressed, particularly in the later Middle Ages with its slogan *Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia,* that the actual meaning of many texts had become obscured.

The poet in the preacher kept alive Donne's interest in allegory. That his prose style is not extreme is apparent after we realize how much of the metaphoric practice is avowedly from one or another of the Church Fathers. Even the unacknowledged passages are oft reminiscent in their patristic tone. That Donne himself used allegory for more than flowery effect is indicated in the beginning of the 1624 Easter sermon:

> The literall sense is alwayes to be preserved; but the literall sense is not alwayes to be discerned: for the literall sense is not alwayes that, which the very Letter and Grammer of the place presents, as where it is literally said, *That Christ is a Vine*, and literally, *That his flesh is bread*, and literally, *That the new Jerusalem is thus situated, thus built, thus furnished*: But the literall sense of every place, is the principall intention of the Holy Ghost, in that place: And his principall intention in many places, is to expresse things by allegories, by figures; so that in many places of Scripture, a figurative sense is the literall sense, and more in this book [the Apocalypse] then in any other. . . . In the figurative exposition of those places of Scripture, which require that way oft to be figuratively expounded, that Expositor is not to be blamed, who not destroying the literall sense, proposes such a figurative sense, as may exalt our devotion, and advance our edification; And as no one of those Expositors did ill, in proposing one such sense, so neither do those Expositors ill, who with those limitations, that it destroy not the literall sense, that it violate not the analogy of faith, that it advance devotion, do propose another and another such sense. So doth that preacher well also, who to the same end, and within the same limit, makes his use of both, of all those expositions; because all may stand, and it is not evident in such figurative speeches, which is the literall, that is, the principall intention of the Holy Ghost.

Similar is the meaning of an earlier statement made by Donne in the *Essays in Divinity*, where he expressed his conviction that the Bible must be understood in its literal sense, although

> that also is not the literall, which the letter seems to present, for so to diverse understandings there might be diverse literall senses; but it is called literall, to distinguish it from the Morall, Allegoricall, and the other senses; and is that which the Holy Ghost doth in that place principally intend.[5]

[5] Edition of 1651, p. 84. The 1624 Easter sermon passage is from LXXX, 19, pp. 183 and 184.

4

The second characteristic of metaphysical homiletic style is its ingenious straining after wit. I am here reminded of Samuel Johnson's famous remark (which applies to prose writers, though he intended it for poets) that such wit may be considered a kind of *discordia concors*, a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike. The word *wit*—which later, in Hobbes' day, became a synonym for *fancy*—is at this time the English equivalent of the French *esprit*, the Italian *ingegno*, and the Spanish *ingenio*. Whereas in the Elizabethan Age wit denoted the intellect in general as differentiated from *will* or the faculty of volition, gradually the native word *wit* acquired the signification of ingenuity and became identical with the imaginative or fanciful element in style, being more or less important as this element was valued by successive schools of opinion.

Notice how closely this second trait resembles the first, already discussed. Many surviving sermons by various preachers reveal evidence that facility in discovering resemblances, often in wholly unexpected objects or events, was the essence of pulpit wit. It apparently was as normal and habitual a practice among the clergy as among the educated laity. Ingenious it was; far-fetched it became; humorous it at times sought to be; and yet this device cannot be roundly condemned as inappropriate. In addition to being an intellectual challenge, it no doubt helped recall the wandering attention of church listeners during the hour-long sermons and is certainly a lure to the indifferent reader of the printed copy. It is saturated with thought. I confess that this enlivening quality of surprise revived my tiring interest several times during lengthy perusal of the ponderous folios. I concede, however, that such a tendency to eclipse content for the sake of cultivating the ornaments of manner is actually, as Bacon aptly remarked about men studying words rather than matter, the first distemper of learning.

Such ingenuity is present thirty-three times in Donne's sermons on the resurrection theme. Typical are the following comments. God said man shall eat his bread *in sudore vultus*, in the sweat of his brow; but many men never sweat till they

sweat with eating. The caprice of death, its wantonness and sportfulness, is revealed when we see a man cannon-proof in time of war but slain in peacetime with his own pistol, or a man recovered after drowning and then living only to hang himself. No man is so bed-rid with age in the grave that he cannot rise again. It is one of God's blessings to have an audience with circumcised ears. It is a strange doctrine which calls men because of their contempt of the active life *nullanos*, men who do nothing, and in contempt of the contemplative life *ignorantes*, men who know nothing. The mere natural man who will not know Christ has a left-handed atheism, and the stubborn papist who is not content with Christ has a right-handed atheism.[6] To sew pillows under the elbows of a king, as flatterers do, is one thing; to pull the chair from under the king, as popular and seditious men do, is another thing. Almanac divinity changes with the season and time, meridional divinity is calculated to the height of such and such a place, lunar divinity ebbs and flows, and state divinity obeys affections of persons. They who suffered in persecution lay and bled with more ease than the executioner stood and sweat, and embraced the fire more fervently than he blew it. The grave is the furnace which ripens the body for the last resurrection. We will not so much distribute the text (I Cor. 15, 29) into an explication of the particular words, which is as the mintage and coining of gold into several lesser pieces, as lay up the whole wedge and ingot of gold all at once in you, namely, the precious assurance of your glorious resurrection. As Jerome says, he who will relish Christ and feed upon the Bread of Life will not be diligent to make precious dung and curious excrements, i. e. to spend his purse and wit in that which, being taken into him, must pass by so ignoble a way from him. The women at Christ's tomb could not easily have pulled off Christ's winding-sheet even if it had had no other

[6] The popular accusation that the youthful Jack Donne had been an atheist (convenient tag of shame!) is correctly rebutted by John Sparrow in "Donne's Religious Development," *Theology*, 32 (1931). 144:

"The surest proof that Donne, even from his earliest years and even in his most dissolute days, believed in God, is to be found in the fact that atheism never infects his earliest writings, and is never made a matter of self-reproach even in the most penitential writings of his later years. . . . Donne himself attacked it, almost pityingly, in his sermons."

glue, no other gum but His precious blood to hold it. They who have done evil shall pass into a farther heat without light; and they who have done good, into a farther light without heat.

Sometimes Donne's wit is based upon close logic. In the 1628 Easter sermon he refers to Augustine's speaking of discourses that passed between his mother and himself not long before her death. *Perambulavimus cuncta mortalia et ipsum coelum*, we walked ourselves above this earth and above all the heavens, and *venimus in mentes nostras et transcendimus eas*, we came to the consideration of our own minds and were got above our own souls. Donne thereupon draws parallels in suggesting similar mystic experiences, such as, did Christ really suffer the very torments of very hell—because it is essential to the torments of hell to be eternal? Again, did Adam in his ecstasy in paradise, or Moses in his conversation on the mount, or the apostles in the transfiguration of Christ, or St. Paul in his rapture to the third heaven really see the essence of God—because he that is admitted to such a manifestation can never look off nor lose that sight? These religious conundrums must have made the listeners ponder as much as smile.

More frequently, as we should expect of a thinker, Donne's distinctive wit is shown in oxymoron, epigrammatic paradox. The modern idea of taking a flat map on which east and west are as far asunder as two points can be, and reducing this flat map to the roundness of a globe on which east and west actually touch and are one, occurs repeatedly and usually with the application that man's life is such a paradoxical circle with womb and grave the meeting points.[7] Another effective but obvious contrast is often made in this rhetorical question: when was ever such a death as God to die, or when such a life as a dead man to raise Himself again? These two patterns are woven into the fabric of almost every one of the eleven Easter sermons.

Chief among further specimens is the following paradox. Using Nazianzen as source, Donne develops a fourfold antithesis on the theme *quodnam mysterium*, what a mystery am I as man, because *parvus sum et magnus*, less in body than

[7] Special discussions of the frequent figures of map and circle are given, in addition to the usual commentaries, in *National Rev.* 34 (1899). 611, and in *MLN*, 19 (1904). 76-78 and 192.

many creatures in the world, I am yet greater in the compass and extent of soul than all the world. Or *humillimus sum et excelsus*, under a necessity of spending some thoughts upon this low world, I am yet of ability to contemplate the next world. Or *mortalis sum et immortalis*, in a body that dies ever since it was made, I carry a soul or rather it carries me to such a perpetuity that no saint, no angel, not even God Himself shall over-live me. Or *terrenus sum et coelestis*, I have a body of earth, but of such earth as God was the molder of, and a soul of which God was the father.

Here are a few more examples of wit. On Good Friday He who bore up the heavens bowed down His head, He Who gives breath to all life gave up the ghost. As Augustine once said, *assit motio absit fatigatio, assit potestas vescendi absit necessitas esuriendi*, in heaven there is motion without fatigue, there is the ability without the necessity of eating. As I grow up, I become in middle-age a gray-headed infant, and but the ghost of my youth. Angels of heaven were employed in so low an office as to catechize women, and women were employed in so high an office as to catechize apostles. Since Christ's resurrection the grave no longer buries the dead man but death itself, for I live even in death and death dies in me—that optimism of faith most vividly etched in the concluding line ("... death, thou shalt die") of famous sonnet X of the *Divine Poems*.

5

The exaggerated importance given to certain words and expressions is the third metaphysical characteristic. Samples of it in Andrewes' preaching are:

> ... *El*, the mighty God. As if, with that great *El* [i. e. capital L in English approximates the Hebrew sound] all the inferior *EL*s were not attendant, *Micha-el*, and *Gabri-el*.

and this passage:

> They cried *Crucifige*, at the time (that is) *fasten*; *fasten* Him *to the Crosse*: but that *fastening* was His *loosing*; for it lost Him and cost Him His life, Which was the *Solutum est* of this *Solvite*.[8]

[8] From Nativity Sermon IX and from Resurrection Sermon X in the 1635 folio of XCVI *Sermons*, pp. 80 and 487. Andrewes' sermons were reprinted in *The*

Donne's Easter sermons abound in this conventional, learned word-play on foreign phrases, but the Dean of St. Paul's inevitably clarifies with an English paraphrase and explanation. E. g., in analyzing the textual background of Psalm 89, verse 48, for his exegesis, Donne probes into the Hebrew original מִי גֶּבֶר but writes it in the Anglicized form *mi gheber*, and then shows why the possible Hebrew synonym *ish* אִישׁ which was the first name of man in the Scriptures and signifies only a sound, or *adam* אָדָם, another early name of man which signifies red earth, or enos אֱנוֹשׁ, still another name for man which signifies merely a wretched creature, cannot apply; namely, because *gheber*, or *vir* in Latin, means properly a man accomplished in all excellencies and accompanied with all advantages.

This synonym analysis is applied philology rather than theology. Such use of Hebrew, derived mainly from Old Testament acquaintance, was fairly common in the general practice of the day in city churches. Similar general use of Greek derived principally from New Testament acquaintance is strangely missing in Donne's devotional writings, no doubt because he studied certain Greek authors in Latin translations. He quotes the New Testament habitually in the Vulgate form; in fact, Vulgate idioms are most frequent, and indicate the bilingual nature of Donne's hearers and readers. His favorite device is an euphonious balance of sounds in an harmonious antithesis of ideas, a combination of rhetorical techniques that we can trace to ecclesiastical schematic prose of Chaucer's period and earlier. In the Easter sermons the best of Latin phrasal juxtapositions are: *morte moriemini* and *forte moriemini; coemiteria* and *dormitoria; illuxit nobis* and *illuxit vobis; opportune volentibus* and *importune nolentibus; Gloria Dei* and *Gloria Deo; nunc* and *tunc; vidit* and *audivit*. Sometimes the paramoion is borrowed from paraphrases of certain authorities, such as the evangelist John's record of Christ's *Ego pono* and *Ego sumo*, or Tertullian's *signatum est* and *significatum est*, or Ambrose's *nomen inane* and *crimen immane*. Once a Latin proverb appears, the *in urbe, in orbe* descriptive of Rome.

Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, vols. 1 to 5. Derived from mediaeval Latin, "lost Him and cost Him" is a striking metaphysicalism.

Once also a triad is attained, in the phrase *clamor hortatorius, suasorius, iussorius.*

English words and groupings are schematized similarly. The poet's instinctive love of riming and assonant sounds accounts for this mannerism. When extremes are touched, we suspect that no longer is a musician ringing changes on verbal chimes, but a witty preacher is irresistibly stressing his own ingenuity. "Expressing the pressing of their depressions doth but chafe the wax" is a phrasal pattern as unusual as when Donne elsewhere remarked that God "flings, and slings, and stings the soul of the sinner." Simpler and more characteristic are these verbal schemata selected from the Easter group: apprehensive and comprehensive; to institute and to constitute; to deprecate and to imprecate; to repeal and to appeal; mere and near; to condemn and to contemn; circumcision and excision; aversion and conversion; diffidence and confidence; mention and intention; subversion and submersion; to prevent and to present; wound and bound.

Occasionally even a triad is reached, as in creation, confirmation, and revelation. A double pair is developed in the most involved of Donne's oratory: some ministers have clouds in their understanding and knowledge by being less learned than others, and clouds in their elocution and utterance by having an unacceptable delivery, and clouds in their aspect and countenance by having an unpleasant presence, and clouds in their respect and maintenance by being oppressed in their fortunes. Other words placed in less euphonious pairs are: epistle and apostle, mercy and misery, clouds and clouts, conscience and science, paced and passed, loss and at last, own and one, death and depth, edification and foundation, amazed and amused. Obvious is the Latin origin of most of these words.

Rare but attractive is the occurrence of alliteration, as when we are told that Job, Jeremiah, and Jonah expostulate and chide with God out of a weariness of their lives; or again, that Miriam and Mary are the same name in women just as Joshua and Jesus are in men; or, that the Pope's power has been diligently painted and printed and preached and set out in the promises and practises of his instruments; or, that to choose to be ill in the sight of God rather than to look ill in the sight

of men is a perverse and poisonous physic. Actual repetition occurs in three ways. Donne echoes the same word with different adjectives, such as amorous soul, ambitious soul, covetous soul, voluptuous soul, what would'st thou have in heaven? Again, he iterates a prefix, as in speaking of a transfusion, a transplantation, a transmigration, a transmutation of the believer in Christ; or in declaring that a resurrection of the soul seems an improper, an impertinent, an improbable, an impossible form of speech. Finally, he repeats a suffix, as when men are said to tumble and wallow licentiously, promiscuously, indifferently, inconsiderately in all ways of incontinency.

Not surprising in the public addresses of an author who could pun upon his own name in a sacred lyric, the *Hymne to God the Father*, is the presence of an occasional pun. Thus Donne says in 1622 on Easter Day: "This day both God's sons arose, the sun of His firmament and the Son of His bosom; and if one sun do set upon us, the other will stay as long as our devotion lasts." [9] Another *double entendre* is sea and ecclesiastic See, and still another occurs in the context of the crusades where pilgrims are said to have carried sepulchres, namely by their deaths, to the Sepulchre.

To Donne's credit, there is little wandering off the subject into the popular Rabbinical and cabbalistic speculations on the esoteric implications of letters and numbers. Minute attention to mere grammatical cases or parts of speech is not found in these sermons, though it was popular. Nor would Donne have agreed with the practice voiced by one of his early successors as Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. Richard Stuart, that "when the Text is pleased to expatiate, each word must needs be Doctrinall." But our poet-preacher shows interest in clever interpretations based on phrases, such as when he shows that heathen gods lose their godliness when diverse localities claim

[9] I have modernized the spelling and punctuation for emphasis. This very pun occurs four times in the eleven Easter sermons and frequently elsewhere; e. g., LXXX, 2, p. 13; *ibid.*, 45, p. 450; L, 37, p. 343; the Chelsea sermon, not in the folios but reprinted in *The Works of John Donne, D. D.*, with a memoir of his life, by Henry Alford, 6. 265; *Holy Sonnet* number 2, line 5, reprinted in Grierson's edition of Donne's poems, 1. 322; verse-letter to Mrs. M. H., reprinted in Grierson, *ibid.*, 1. 216 with note in 2. 99. In the London *TLS* (Dec. 11, 1919), p. 750, a letter by E. W. W. discusses "Donne's Puns."

to have the *tomb* of this or that deity; or when he is intrigued by the fact that Christ *rose* whereas others like Lazarus and Dorcas were only raised from the dead, a natural contrast emphasized often in resurrection preaching. Although he wisely cautioned his hearers against probing needlessly into the technicalities of God's propagation of the Gospel, or into the mysteries of Egyptian embalming systems, Donne himself could not resist almost as strange an investigation of apocryphal theories of salvation and occult resemblances of the microcosm. Sometimes he would command attention instantly by a choice phrase, as in the beginning of the 1622 sermon he builds up the contrast between the *in principio* of the first book of the Bible, Genesis, and the *in principio* of the last book in the order in which these books were written, the Gospel according to St. John. Here Donne goes on to point out that the first book of the Bible is a revelation, and so is the last one in the order as they stand, a Revelation.

Interesting because to us archaic are the numerous polysyllabic and invariably merely transliterated, Anglicized words from Latin, a quaintness of vocabulary which we today associate with the diction of the Authorized Version of the Bible. A list of such words in Donne's Easter sermons includes colluctation, cautelous, interlocutory, hypostatical, pretermit, ingeminate, sibilation, colliquation, commination, conventicle, inchoation, impenitible, evisceration, exposititious, supposititious, coruscation, interpunction, macerate, praemunire, excaecation, reluctation, compellation, morosity, exinanition, conculcation, detort, anhelation, immutation, illation, sepose, lanthorn, reefformation, sustentation, philologer, patefaction, exentorate, increpation, deprehend, filiation, pectoral, pretermit, remember (in our meaning of remind), conscience (in our meaning of consciousness), design (in our meaning of designate), presently (in our meaning of instantly), prevent (in our meaning of come before), betimes (in our meaning of early), preoccupate, re-compact, mancipate, quillet, concatenation, patefaction, etc.

6

The last two characteristics of the metaphysical style in Donne's Easter sermons will be treated briefly because illustrations have already been given and merely the statistics, so to speak, need be discussed with a few special examples. To the fourth trait we can attach a definite time of origin because the parading of authorities, usually in paraphrase but occasionally by quotation in Latin, formed a vital part of the polemic against Roman Catholicism. It was an unfortunate trend in the Church of England when not only this custom of corroboration or refutation but the very knowledge of the works which men had previously cited began to decay. The mediaeval appeal to authority by preachers who desired to prove themselves successors of Chrysostom and Augustine, seems to have dwindled into decorative rhetoric in the Jacobean Era. Certainly the abuse was perpetuated by a lazy use of commonplace-books. No wonder Glanvill censured such " Collectors that make Nosegays, and pick a piece out of one Author, and a piece out of another; so that the whole is a medley of different things all mingled." But Donne's authorities are offered sincerely, with more than ornamental effect.

Walton's biography of Donne prefixed to LXXX reveals the Dean's having made or at least having had a well stocked commonplace-book which contained " the resultance of 1400. Authors, most of them analyzed with his owne hand." This useful digest had been gleaned from the vast reading resulting from Donne's avowed (in a 1608 letter to Sir H. Goodyere) " Hydroptique immoderate desire of humane learning and languages," and from Donne's extensive earlier assistance of Dr. Thomas Morton in his controversies with Catholic writers. The appendix to Keynes' *Bibliography of Dr. John Donne* gives a partial list of the books that formed Donne's library. The multitude of authorities cited by Donne in general are tabulated by Ramsay in her investigation of his philosophy. An enumeration of " such Authors, as are either cited, illustrated, or refelled " in the first folio of sermons is in the rear of LXXX and is the best way to discover the vast scope of Donne's reading acquaintance. Just as interesting as the personality of this vigorous writer who could turn to practical use the

most unlikely circumstance in his life, in the curious *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions*, is his unquestionably genuine familiarity with the sources he mentions in the Easter sermons, usually by author and sometimes also by title.

The Bible (next to the Authorized Version, the Vulgate especially) is of primary importance, with " the apostle " i. e. Paul the writer most frequently quoted. The Church Fathers appear very frequently in these festival discourses. Lacking the weight of centuries of argument for its particular doctrinal difference, the Anglican faith inevitably adopted into its system as its rightful heritage the pertinent comments of earlier apologists in church history; and Donne found himself easily at home in the Anglo-Catholic fold. Of this group the oftenest used are Augustine, who was singularly important in shaping Donne's philosophy of life; Jerome, who in greatest measure molded his theological outlook; Chrysostom, who most motivated his eloquence; and Tertullian, the Seneca of patristic Latin, who directly influenced his style. Other writers included in the frequent designation " the Fathers " or " the School " and whose names are given either in the sermon or are listed in the pertinent margin are Ambrose, Justin Martyr, Cyprian, Dionysius, Damascene, Cyril Alexandrinus, Clement Alexandrinus, Origen, Aquinas, Athanasius, Theophylact, Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Athenagoras, Basil, Oecumenius, Prudentius, Procopius, Chrysologus, Gregory Nyssen, Theodoret, etc. Once " the philosopher " is mentioned; the reference is traceable to Aristotle's ΜΕΤΑΦΤΣΙΚΗΣ, book I. Twice " the moral man " is spoken of, with marginal reference to Seneca, traceable to his *Ad Lucilium Epistolae Morales*, number 11. Luther is cited four times, Calvin nine times, and Calvin's disciple Beza once. Once the proverbial " whom the gods love, die young " idea is used, the margin crediting it to Menander, ostensibly meaning Fragment 4 of ΔΙΣ ΕΞΑΠΑΤΩΝ.

The fifth and final characteristic of metaphysical style in homiletic prose is its numerous, sometimes illogical, and often unnecessarily detailed divisions and sub-divisions. When George Herbert was presented with the living of Bemerton in Wiltshire and set down his rules then resolved upon for the various duties of a country parson (embodied in 1633 in *A*

Priest to the Temple, chapter 7 whereof is called The Parson Preaching), he remarked pointedly about this way of crumbling a text into small parts. But such minute outlining was not merely a clerical affectation; it was derived from a rhetorical mnemonic plan which delighted in designating its parts in Latin.

That this analytic device was favored by the laity too is seen in e. g. William Austin's *Devotionis Augustinianae Flamma*, issued by his widow in 1635. A barrister of Lincoln's Inn and a friend of distinguished men like Howell, Selden, and Edward Alleyn, this man represents the theologically learned and devout layman of the Walton, Wotton, and Evelyn type. The relation of his book to Donne, whom Austin probably heard preach often at Lincoln's Inn, is important. Austin indulges in figurative diction and similitudes; displays clever wit; plays upon the meanings of words, and often on Latin words from the Vulgate; reveals a minute and accurate knowledge of the Fathers and Schoolmen; and above all, delights in divisions into leading topics introduced by *Qui, Quando, Quo Modo, Quare*, etc. Perhaps Austin was a close imitator of his favorite preachers, but more probably his technique suggests the reading, education, and devotional expression of the better class layman. Would not an audience of such persons also influence its preacher?

As before, Donne does not overdo. In the Easter sermons he usually has a threefold major division, supplemented by pertinent subheads. I have chosen as illustration the longest of the eleven because it shows in greatest detail Donne's logical outlining process, though it was originally preached on Easter Monday and was not intended for a cathedral audience. The heading to XXVI, 25, states that this is "a Sermon Preached at the Spittle [the old priory of St. Mary Spital or Hospital in Bethnal Green, where stood a pulpit cross] upon Easter-Munday 1622." The text is II Corinthians 4, verse 6: "For God, who commanded light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Between a brief *Introductio* and a short *Conclusio* is the essential *Divisio*, itemized as follows:

I. *Creatio*
- A. *Idem Deus*
- B. *Sicut Deus*
- C. *Quid Deus*
  1. *Dixit*
  2. *Dixit lucem*
  3. *Dixit de tenebris lucem*

II. *Vocatio*
- A. *Positivo*
  1. *Lucet*
  2. *Illuxit*
  3. *In cordibus*
  4. *Nostris*
- B. *Comparativo*
  1. *Fecit*
  2. *Dixit*
  3. *Vidit*

III. *Glorificatio*
- A. *Scientia*
- B. *Gloria Dei*
- C. *In Facie*
- D. *Consummative*
  1. *Addendum*
  2. *Addendum*
  3. *Addendum*

Such systematic outlines are tabulated in the appropriate place in the margin of the printed folios; for a few Easter sermons, however, the outline is not complete. In the 1628 and 1630 sermons Donne added a resumé to bind up the sheaf, as he once said, and to lay it thus upon the audience that they might the more easily carry it.

7

For the same reason I too shall end with a brief summary of the merit of metaphysical style in Donne's Easter sermons, based upon the evidence in this essay as culled from the original printed texts. Since abuse does not invalidate a proper use, we should not automatically condemn prose which has mannerisms popular in a bygone generation. Donne's mastery of homiletic style merits him a prominent place among the great English pulpit orators of his century, Lancelot Andrewes, Isaac Barrow, Robert South, William Laud, Jeremy Taylor, and John Tillotson. Much of his artistic ability in this respect is to be credited to familiarity with composition theory such as was given in the contemporary Bartholomew Keckermann's *Rhetoricae Ecclesiasticae sive Artis Formandi et Habendi Conciones Sacras*. Donne's achievement stems from the inspiration and challenge of the metaphysical vogue so fashionable when he was a clergyman, steeped in mediaeval theory and conditioned by renaissance practice. His less extreme method shown in the Easter festival sermons does successfully stand the fivefold test of contemporary and later critics, and indicates an important chapter in the development of modern prose.

Valparaiso University

DR. JOHNSON AND WAR

By H. R. Kilbourne

We talked of war. Johnson. 'Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier, or not having been at sea.' Boswell. 'Lord Mansfield [Chief Justice of England] does not.' Johnson. 'Sir, if Lord Mansfield were in a company of General Officers and Admirals who have been in service, he would shrink; he'd wish to creep under the table. . . . No, Sir, were Socrates and Charles the Twelfth of Sweden both present in any company, and Socrates to say, "Follow me, and hear a lecture in philosophy;" and Charles, laying his hand on his sword, to say, "Follow me, and dethrone the Czar:" a man would be ashamed to follow Socrates. Sir, the impression is universal; yet it is strange.

Here at his bow-wow best is Dr. Samuel Johnson. Now not all men will agree that the Doctor's opinions on soldiers, or on any other subject, are patterns of pure wisdom; and yet, despite the heat and table-thumping which often marred them, most men concede that through the many and varied pronouncements of that practical philosopher there runs a rightness, a rightness built upon shrewd observation and solid sense. Johnson knew life; and because they are a part of life Johnson knew soldiers and the profession of arms. And not only did he know them; he liked them.

He knew them because the England of his day was embroiled in almost continual warfare. As Sydney Smith put it in 1827: "Alas! We have been at war thirty-five minutes out of every hour since the peace of Utrecht [1713]." Born in the year when the names of Marlborough and Malplaquet were on men's tongues, and dying three years after Cornwallis surrendered his sword to Washington at Yorktown, Johnson saw his country carry on four major wars. In his lifetime England won India and lost America.

Seasonable indeed is the dinner-party conversation recorded above, for it was spoken at a time (the Spring of 1778) when all England sweated in a war fever. Natural it was that the company "talked of war." These were times that tried English souls. The struggle with the rebelling American colonies,

unpopular from the start, had gone none too well; and now the rebels were carrying the fight to Britain's very shores. Complacent Englishmen, who since the days of the great Pitt had looked upon the seven seas as English lakes, began to stare and gasp at the extraordinary news. Brash American privateers were capturing English vessels in the Irish sea; that patriotic but piratic ace, John Paul Jones, had actually plundered and burned English shipping in a Scottish harbor! And now, to crown the public pain and dismay, came rumors of an invasion by those life-long enemies, France and Spain. The nation was aroused: troop movements to America were cancelled; dockyards hummed with life; militia camps sprang up; an alarmed people rushed for muskets to throw back the invader. But English fears, as in the bygone days of Philip of Spain and the years to come of Bonaparte, were happily laid at rest. While it lasted, however, the scare was a good one. It served to bring home to men's business and bosoms their army and navy.

But not only did Johnson live in times when soldiers were much in the public eye; his manly and bulldog spirit was naturally attracted by fighting men. From his Uncle Andrew, one-time heavyweight champion of Smithfield, he had learned boxing, and he never lost his love for hard-hitters. He earned his first bread by writing for *The Gentleman's Magazine* (1740) lives of those great English sea-dogs Sir Francis Drake and Admiral Robert Blake, whose deeds in service of their country he relates with obvious enthusiasm. The same gusto is apparent in a later short biography of Frederick the Great of Prussia. In a Life of the mild Renaissance scholar, Roger Ascham, the Doctor betrays his love for the common soldier by using Ascham's *Toxophilus*, a treatise on the benefit of archery, as a peg upon which to hang John-Bullish praise for the yeoman archers at Agincourt under Harry the Fifth; and flushed with the recollection of this historic feat of English arms he plunges into another digression, drawn from an army manual, on the development of the musket.

Boswell records an early letter from Johnson to his publisher, Cave, pointing out the need for a Military Dictionary, which probably was never published. From Boswell, too, we

learn that Johnson at one time planned a Life of that great English cavalry commander, Oliver Cromwell, an undertaking reluctantly abandoned because of a dearth of authentic fresh material. From an early letter we learn of yet another unfulfilled proposal: a play called *Charles of Sweden*. That Johnson's fancy was caught by the bold exploits of Charles XII is clear enough, for though we have not the play, there remain those famous thirty-two lines on Swedish Charles in *The Vanity of Human Wishes* ending:

> He left the name, at which the world grew pale,
> To point a moral, or adorn a tale.

These, incidentally, are the thirty-two lines which have won the praise of such disparate critics as James Boswell, who declares them "as highly finished a picture as can possibly be conceived," and Mr. T. S. Eliot, who says simply: "If lines 189-220 of *The Vanity of Human Wishes* are not poetry, I do not know what is."

Johnson's strong sense of justice and hatred of political incompetency are well known, and it was these qualities, coupled no doubt with his admiration for fighting men, that led him to a warm and spirited but unavailing public defence of the unfortunate Admiral Byng, court-martialled and shot on the quarter-deck of the *Monarque* in Portsmouth harbor, in 1757, for alleged neglect of duty at the relief of Minorca.

But there is yet stronger evidence of the Doctor's interest in matters military. The *annus mirabilis* of eighteenth century English army and navy successes, it will be remembered, was 1759. Hand-picked by the peerless war minister Pitt, and aflame with boldness and daring, young and able English admirals and generals were playing such havoc with the enemy that Horace Walpole declared "our bells are worn threadbare with ringing for victories," and "we are forced to ask every morning what victory there has been for fear of missing one." The scene was indeed one to warm English hearts, for on all fronts their dearest enemy, France, was on the run. Boscawen destroyed M. de la Clue's Toulon fleet at Lagos Bay; Rodney, in a fifty-two hour bombardment, demolished the flat-bottomed French transports at Havre; Hawke defied shallow water and granite reefs to blow to pieces M. Conflans's Brest fleet at

Quiberon Bay; English infantry routed French cavalry at Minden; and Wolfe scaled the heights of Abraham to humble Montcalm at Quebec. The list is long. And throughout the following year (1760) the bells of England rang out more victories. Forgotten like a bad dream were the defeats of a few years earlier, when in an excellently humorous and ironical *Idler* (No. 8) Johnson twitted the army on its helplessness against French forest-fighters and Indian war-whoops at Forts Duquesne and Ticonderoga; where " we have been beaten by enemies whom we did not see, and . . . have avoided the sight of enemies lest we should be beaten." But gone were those lean years; the lion's roar was once more heard in the land, and that man was a caitiff indeed who did not fondly believe the vulgar tradition that one Englishman can beat three of any other breed.

Now Samuel Johnson was too thoroughly patriotic not to have relished to the full these crushing strokes on land and sea; his thoughts upon the power and prestige of English arms must have been many and varied. It is not surprising then to find among a list of resolutions for this year (1760) in the *Prayers and Meditations* the brief entry: " Send for books for Hist. of War." Boswell believed Johnson intended to write " a history of the recent and wonderful successes of the British arms in all quarters of the globe." Later editors have thought Johnson had in mind a history of war in general. But whatever the intent, it is clear that the Doctor had not only an interest in war, but the desire to be a war historian. That he did not carry out his design need not surprise anyone who knows the Doctor, who was to use his own words, " a lazier dog, if possible " than Presto, his friend Thrale's pet. Writing a military history involved labor; and Johnson in 1760, hardly recovered from the eight year single-handed grind on the *Dictionary*, loved labor less than leisure. There was also, of course, the Shakespeare edition, proposals for which had been issued four years previously and for which publisher and subscribers were beginning to clamor. False chroniclers of war are ridiculed in *Idler* No. 20, a shrewd satire in which the recent capture of Louisbourg from the French is reported, first as an English and then as a French historian might describe it. Behind the irony looms the moral: " There is no crime more infamous than the

violation of Truth "—a text the Doctor preached and lived by as have few men. Johnson's *History of War*, whatever its other merits or defects, would have aimed at truth.

Thus by lives of fighting men and by a projected history of war Johnson showed his interest in the profession of arms. But that interest is even more directly proved by his fondness for military men and military surroundings. On his single visit to France he was a guest at the *École Militaire*, and was charmed by its Commandant. Three years later, in the summer of 1778 and only a few months after the conversation which opens these pages, Johnson visited Warley Camp in Essex, where his friend Bennett Langton, called into service by the threatened French and Spanish invasion, was stationed as a captain in the Royal North Lincolnshire militia. The visit, described by Langton in a letter to Boswell, lasted five days. Notwithstanding his poor health (he was sixty-nine and in constant pain) Johnson, says his host, was vastly interested in the scene about him, " as agreeing with the disposition he constantly manifested toward enquiring into subjects of the military kind." Few civilians are allowed the intimate view of army life permitted to Johnson by the militia authorities. The visitor was assigned a tent, and with amused curiosity he lumbered about the camp for five days " enlarging his notions." Much was to be learned. Warley Camp, the second largest of the training camps hastily thrown up in Southeastern England to repel the invaders, had under canvas fourteen regiments, comprising 11,000 men from all parts of the country. The thousands upon thousands of tents stood in a line nearly a mile and three-quarters long and three-quarters of a mile deep. Into such a sea of soldiers plunged our Czar of letters. He dined with General Hall, the commanding officer, and became very chummy with the General's aide-de-camp, Captain Smith, with whom he engaged " in a great deal of discourse." He sat with grave attention through a regimental court-martial presided over by Langton; marched about in the dead of night with the guard changing reliefs; observed very critically the reloading of muskets; and debated with his host and his fellow officers the technicalities of gunpower and ballistics.

The experience impressed him, for a few months later he wrote to Mrs. Tharle: " A camp is one of the great scenes of

human life. War and peace divide the business of the world. Camps are the habitations of those who conquer kingdoms, or defend them." And when little Queeney Thrale complained that her uncle (Sir Robert Cotton) had been forced to live in a tent at Warley, to her a degrading circumstance, Johnson reminded the young lady of Alexander and Darius; Caesar and Pompey; Tamerlane and Bajazet; Charles, Peter, and Augustus—greater men all than Sir Robert—who lived in tents. But if Warley Camp impressed Dr. Johnson, Dr. Johnson no less impressed Warley Camp. For his ready knowledge of army matters astonished Warley's militia officers much as it had surprised the hard-bitten regulars of Fort George in Scotland five years earlier, where, says Boswell, "he made a very good figure upon these topics."

It must not be forgotten that Johnson numbered among his friends some of the foremost military men of the day. Boswell lists as a close companion "the brilliant Colonel Forester of the Guards," and it is clear that the Doctor was very fond of the distinguished Captain (later Admiral) Burney, brother of his pet, Fanny. Admiral Walsingham was another close friend. It was at a gay party of Walsingham's that Johnson made his crushing reply to the coxcomb who with rare impertinence asked, "Pray now, what would you give, old gentleman, to be as young and sprightly as I am?" "Why, Sir, I think," replied Johnson, "I would almost be content to be as foolish."

The Doctor's prime favorite, however, was that practical soldier, colonizer, and prison reformer, General James Oglethorpe. The mixed hazards and adventures of the founder of Georgia had made him something of a social lion; his dinner-parties, enlivened by the host's nimble conversation and excellent sack, were celebrated; and Johnson liked nothing better than to be asked to dine at General Oglethorpe's. This old veteran knew books, but he knew more. To the Doctor's fullest favor he held the key—acquaintance with life. So full and varied, indeed, had been his experience ("from pole to pole" as Pope lauds it)[1] that Johnson, who liked best the

[1] "One, driven by strong benevolence of goal,
Shall fly, like Oglethorpe, from pole to pole."
Pope's *Imitation of Horace*, Ep. ii.

biographical part of letters, offered to write his life because he "knew no man whose life would be more interesting." By his modest unwillingness to take up the offer Oglethorpe and literature are joint losers. Thirteen years older than Johnson, Oglethorpe had been a soldier from boyhood. As a mere fourteen-year-old, when most boys are playing at soldiers, he won a commission in the British Army. He had warred with Prince Eugene against the Turks in Europe, and with the Chickasaw Indians against the Spaniards in Florida and Georgia. His training in war was but one of many experiences, but it had been wide and varied; and Johnson, who shared not at all Fontenelle's aversion to war because it spoiled conversation, cannot have failed to pump the old campaigner well on subjects of the military kind. A brief passage of Boswell's illustrates the vividness of his portrayal as well as Johnson's skill in starting up war game:

> Dr. Johnson said, 'Pray, General, give us an account of the siege of Belgrade.' Upon which the General, pouring a little wine upon the table, described everything with a wet finger: 'Here we were, here were the Turks,' &c. &c. Johnson listened with the closest attention.

The Doctor, in fact, would listen with attention to all wars except the Punic War, which became a kind of catchword with him for any subject of dry historical fact or abstract policy. Whenever the *Punic War* was introduced into conversation he always "withdrew his attention and thought about Tom Thumb."

Another soldier friend was that gallant leader of the Corsican struggle for independence "whose glory," says the historian Lamartine, "is out of all proportion to the smallness of his country," General Pascal Paoli. While it may be doubted whether Johnson listened to Paoli with the adoring attention of Boswell, it is clear that many meetings with this distinguished foreign exile enlarged the Doctor's military lore. King George always thought the Corsican a better politician than general, but never did Johnson undervalue him as a soldier. Daring on the battlefield, and wise in council: so stood Paoli's record, and that was enough for Johnson. To dine with the hero of Corsica was one of his great pleasures, and perhaps even more frequent

than the dinners at General Oglethorpe's were those at General Paoli's. True to excellent eighteenth century custom, conversation at these parties ran the gamut: from the state of marriage to the vogue of swearing; from the art of fiddle-playing to fears of a French invasion on which last, incidentally, Johnson always played the rôle of sceptic. The two men were presumably drawn in closest military communion when, during Johnson's stay with Langton and his Lincolnshire militia, General Paoli inspected the camp and commended the troops.

The Englishman's first love among the Services is commonly the Navy; with Johnson it was the Army. Land-animal by nature, and quite deaf to the sea-call that lures so many of his countrymen, he likes soldiers better than sailors, upon whose wretchedness of life, says Boswell, he often "expatiated." These laments for his Majesty's tars were, in the main, just; they were based, as were most of the Doctor's beliefs, on what he actually saw. In the summer of 1762 Johnson visited Devonshire in company with his friend Sir Joshua Reynolds, whose native county it was. Entertainment by the lords and squires of Devon was much in order, but "the greatest part of the time," records our faithful Boswell, "was passed at Plymouth, where the magnificence of the navy, the ship-building and all its circumstances, afforded him a grand subject of contemplation." And well might the Doctor contemplate, for only three years had elapsed since the *annus mirabilis* of English triumphs at sea; the Royal Navy was at its highest pitch of excellence. Mrs. Piozzi declares that on this occasion Johnson passed a week visiting a Captain Knight aboard a battleship. The Great Cham of Literature mewed up for a week aboard a man-o'-war! But Scholars will not allow it. They have shown that an officer named Knight commanded H. M. S. *Belleisle*, lying in Plymouth Sound at the time of Johnson's visit, but they think it unlikely that the Doctor visited the ship for that length of time.

However long Johnson spent actually treading battleship decks, it seems clear that his first-hand observation of the navy at Plymouth helped in no small measure to form his oft-repeated and droll opinion, remarkably lacking in enthusiasm,

of the life of a sailor. "The manner in which time was spent on shipboard," he growled, "would make all who saw a cabin envy a gaol." And at another time he said, "No man will be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into a jail; for being in a ship is being in a jail, with the chance of being drowned. . . . A man in jail has more room, better food, and commonly better company."

Strange as these words may sound to an English tar or an American gob of our time, they are true enough as a description of the seaman's life in Johnson's day when, in the words of one protesting admiral, "our fleets are first manned by violence and maintained by cruelty." Forced aboard ship by brutal press gangs, English sailors often never set foot on shore again; by actual regulations they were turned over like so many cattle from ship to ship, from expedition to expedition, with no time to recover from the cruelties of long voyages and the ravages of unaccustomed climates. Death struck far less in battle than by disease. For the Seven Year War *The Annual Register* (1763) gives an amazing navy casuality list:

Seamen killed in engagements or accidents	1,512
Died of disease or missing	133,708

Extraordinary it is (and strange that Johnson does not comment upon it) that these men—these victims of heartless press gangs, of iron discipline and scurvy-ridden ships—these were the sailors whose brawn and blood won victory after victory for Hood, for Hawke, for Rodney, and for Boscawen; these were the sailors who in the face of great odds, and in the space of four years, captured over 9,000 enemy ships and all but swept rival commerce from the seas.

But it is time to ask the cause of Johnson's fondness for his country's fighting men; to ask why he should suppose "every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier, or not having been at sea." The answer comes pat: "Sir, the profession of soldiers and sailors has the dignity of danger." *The dignity of danger*: it is a phrase worthy of Johnson, a phrase to be kept in remembrance. Now though a Christian saint and deep in humility, Johnson reckoned courage as the greatest of all virtues; for "unless a man has that

virtue, he has no security for preserving any other." He declares truly that "courage is a quality so necessary to maintaining virtue, that it is always respected, even when it is associated with vice." There are, he would remind us, criminals who win the respect if not the approval of normal men, and perhaps of women too. The lone bank-robber who faces armed guards and cashiers, burglar-alarms and police, is admired while the forger who, in the comfort and security of a hotel room writes bad checks, is not. Both are criminals; but there is the difference of courage. Of the dignity of courage, "which has dazzled mankind from age to age," Johnson loved to talk; it was one of his pet ideas. Indeed, nowhere does the Doctor better show his deep-rooted *Englishness* than in his veneration for any form of courage. Because the profession of arms bred courage, Johnson liked soldiers.

But he was no blind idolater. He was too close an observer of men and things not to distinguish between the soldier of his day in war-time and the same soldier in peace-time. In London he knew general officers whose chief peace-time distinction was that they were professed gamblers. In Scotland he remarked on the wonderful ignorance of regular army officers, "considering how much leisure they have for study, and the acquisition of knowledge." And this ignorance, he found, obstructed not only the approaches to polite learning; it actually blanketed large and vital areas of their own trade, many officers not even knowing the effective ranges of the musket. It grieved his bookish heart that officers stationed at St. James's Palace in London were never to be seen with a book, not even a military book, in their hands. With Marshall Boufflers he believed that "the warrior who cultivates his mind polishes his arms." And so from these unlettered English Guardsmen, courageous though they were, it was a far cry to Colonel Jean Drumgold, Commandant of the *École Militaire* across the channel, whose establishment Johnson visited and whom he described to Boswell as "a very high man . . . a most complete character, for he had been first a professor of rhetoric, and then became a soldier." On army conditions during peace-time Johnson does not mince words. *Idler* No. 21 unfolds this surprising theme: "the most contemptible of all human stations [is] that of a

soldier in time of peace." Then comes the invader Idleness, with his allies Sin and Evil; and Johnson wonders not that armies long to be delivered from their tyranny by war, and restored "to the dignity of active beings." The logic here seems to be that the idle soldier in peace-time is contemptible; the same soldier busy killing upon the battlefield is a dignified human being. How one of our professional pacifists would love crossing swords (conversational of course) with the Doctor over the contradiction! And yet that master fencer, falling back no doubt upon his favorite "dignity of danger" parry, would give a good account of himself.

The truth is that Johnson was often inconsistent when he talked about soldiers, just as he was often contradictory when he dogmatized upon whigs, bishops, or kings. His spoken opinions, like those of all wise men, suffered strange sea-changes. Boswell, indeed, is at pains to tell us that while his master's dislike for the sailor's life was level and abiding, his praise for the life of a soldier rose or fell according as he was in the street or in the study. Conversation seemed to warm, reflection to cool, his enthusiasm. But whether in reflection or in "talking for victory" the Doctor is in complete agreement with himself on the matter of the soldier actually facing his country's enemy. Here the business of the soldier is fighting; and fighting breeds courage and the dignity of danger. Thus does Johnson, with his power of going straight to the core of things, lay hold on what to most men is the central appeal of the soldier: "Mankind reverence those that have got over fear, which is so general a weakness." Whether the Lord Chief Justice of England would, in company with his Majesty's generals and admirals, so have felt his inferiority as to shrink and wish to creep under the table, we may well doubt; and yet Johnson's hearers knew, as all men know, that mankind has been dazzled, not by the lawyer, but by the soldier. If the truth-hunter quarrel with the Doctor's conversational maxims on war and soldiers as contradictory or overdrawn, he may turn to the writings, where speaks the real Johnson. Here is no inconsistency, no hyperbole, no tossing and goring or knocking down with pistol butt, but sober reason and invincible common sense. Johnson's too little known essay, "On the

Bravery of the English Common Soldiers," examines a problem greater perhaps in our time than in his own: the problem of lawlessness and disregard for authority. Those law-abiding citizens, indeed, who look with misgiving upon the boisterous and sometimes disorderly antics of American Legion in annual convention assembled may find comfort in the closing lines of Johnson's shrewd analysis: "They who complain, in peace, of the insolence of the populace, must remember, that their insolence in peace is bravery in war."

That central sanity and saving common sense which so distinguished Johnson's thinking is everywhere apparent when he touches on war. Paying full honor to the dignity of danger, he was under no illusions about war. With Burke he knew full well that war never leaves a nation where it found it. His patriotism might gain force upon the plain of Marathon, but he did not wish for more Marathons. Like so many men today, he was no pacifist; but he hated war. War bred the very courage he so admired, but to those who argued that on this account war was good he retorted with the heroism of firemen during a fire, "and yet who can say a fire is a good thing?" The best Prime Minister the country ever had, he believed, was Sir Robert Walpole, because in spite of Tory pressure he had tried to keep the country at peace. How typical is Boswell's description of Johnson at the Duke of Argyle's in Scotland, where he "took much notice" of his host's extensive collection of weapons, and bade the company "be glad we live in times when arms *may* rust." Johnson hated war; but he was no pacifist. His unconquerable common sense, perhaps his central quality, told him that as war is "the extremity of evil" the first duty of statesmen is to do their utmost to avoid it. His solid knowledge of life, gained by wise reading of the great Book of Mankind, told him that war cannot always be avoided; that as hopelessly diseased human limbs must be removed by amputation, so there may be sometimes a sort of "social gangrene," for which the only remedies are fire and the sword. But such "dreadful operations" are the very last of remedies, and are to be used when all other expedients fail. It is all very clear and common sense. So it seemed to men of Johnson's day; so it seems to most men

today. Equally commonsense were Johnson's views on the conduct of nations in time of war, which, once declared, should he carried on with relentless vigor that peace might come the sooner. For Tom Paine's "summer soldier and sunshine patriot" the Doctor would have had a proper scorn.

So close a critic as Johnson, with four major wars to observe, could not miss the less famous but quite as inglorious horrors of war which occur on the home front. And so he lashes out against those buzzards of war, the profiteers: those patriots who share the profit but not the danger, and who "without bleeding in battle, grow rich by the victory." With fine irony he asks:

> At the conclusion of a ten years' war, how are we recompensed for the death of multitudes and the expense of millions, but by contemplating the sudden glories of paymasters and agents, contractors and commissaries, whose equipages shine like meteors, and whose palaces rise like exhalations?

"In time of war," writes a modern commentator, "the first casualty is truth"; and Johnson, surveying the eighteenth century scene, saw clearly the harmful effects of propaganda. *Idler* No. 30 ends with words which might have come from one who remembers bitterly the vicious lies of that great era 1914-1919:

> Among the calamities of war may be justly numbered the diminution of the love of truth . . . and I know not whether more is to be dreaded from streets filled with soldiers accustomed to plunder, or from garrets filled with scribblers accustomed to lie.

Johnson was no pacifist; and yet no more eloquent plea for peace has ever been made than his description of the miseries of war in *Falkland's Islands*, a pamphlet written to dissuade his countrymen from an unjust and foolish war upon Spain. Since Florence Nightingale and the awful scenes at Scutari decent hospital and ambulance service have lessened many of the horrors hopelessly faced by the sick and wounded of Johnson's day. But the truth still lives in Johnson's memorable lines—lines the elder Pitt used to recite by heart:

> It is wonderful with what coolness and indifference the greater part of mankind see war commenced. Those that hear of it at a distance, or read of it in books, but have never presented its evils to their minds, consider it as little more than a splendid game, a

proclamation, an army, a battle, and a triumph. Some, indeed, must perish in the most successful field, but they die upon the bed of honour, *resign their lives amidst the joys of conquest, and, filled with* England's *glory, smile in death.*

The life of a modern soldier is ill-represented by heroick fiction. War has means of destruction more formidable than the cannon and the sword. Of the thousands and ten thousands, that perished in our late contests with *France* and *Spain*, a very small part ever felt the stroke of an enemy; the rest languished in tents and ships, amidst damps and putrefaction; pale, torpid, spiritless, and helpless; gasping and groaning, unpitied among men, made obdurate by long continuance of hopeless misery; and were, at last, whelmed in pits, or heaved into the ocean, without notice and without remembrance. By incommodious encampments and unwholesome stations, where courage is useless, and enterprise impracticable, fleets are silently dispeopled, and armies sluggishly melted away.

[Captain Kilbourne died September 1, 1944. This paper was written in 1938, while he was a teacher at the Johns Hopkins University.]

THE SYMPATHETIC IMAGINATION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH CRITICISM

By Walter Jackson Bate

The several conceptions of the imagination advanced and evolved by both British philosophy and criticism during the first third of the nineteenth century, far from manifesting a break with the immediate past, were largely grounded in a psychology and an aesthetic developed by many writers of the previous century. Thus, the intuitive working of the imagination, the essential truth of its conception as contrasted with the fallibility of reason, the play of association and the validity of the analogies which the imaginative association of ideas detects,—these, to instance no further, were primary tenets in romantic criticism, and they all received abundant analysis and support from eighteenth-century critics. Particular among these critics were many of the forty-odd philosophers, moralists, and rhetoricians who roughly constituted the eighteenth-century portion of the group known as the "Scottish Common-Sense School"—a group well known to romantic critics, especially Coleridge and Hazlitt. Among the more common romantic *dicta* which had their roots in the preceding century was the insistence that the imagination, by an effort of sympathetic intuition, is able to penetrate the barrier which space puts between it and its object, and, by actually entering into the object, so to speak, secure a momentary but complete identification with it. "If a Sparrow comes before my Window," wrote Keats, "I take part in its existence and pick about the Gravel."[1] For the romantic critics, the preëminent example of the sympathetic imagination is Shakespeare; and characteristic is Hazlitt's assertion that Shakespeare could follow in others the "germs of every faculty and feeling"

[1] November 22, 1817; *Letters* (ed. M. B. Forman, New York, 1935), p. 69. Cf. his lines on the poet (in "The Poet: A Fragment") as

> . . . the man who with a bird,
> Wren or Eagle, finds his way to
> All its instincts.

intuitively, into all their conceivable ramifications, through every change of fortune, or conflict of passion, or turn of thought. . . . He had only to think of anything in order to become that thing, with all the circumstances belonging to it.[2]

The truth of imaginative insight is, of course, a frequent corollary of this doctrine; for by its sympathetic identification the imagination perceives, as the reason cannot, the fundamental reality and inner working, the peculiar "truth" and nature of its object. This function of the imagination, which should perhaps be distinguished from the more recent aesthetic term "empathy,"[3] was frequently expressed by philosophers and critics of the early nineteenth century. It has a place of some prominence, moreover, among major literary figures of the period: the critical opinions of Coleridge, Wordsworth, and even Shelley manifest it; it occupies a somewhat more important position for Keats;[4] and Mr. John Bullitt has shown that it not only underlies the whole of Hazlitt's criticism, but is even the foundation of much of his ethics.[5] The purpose of this immediate article is to emphasize and in some degree to elucidate the eighteenth-century pronouncement and development of this doctrine.

1

The formulation of the sympathetic imagination as a critical and psychological principle cannot be accounted for without

[2] *Lectures on the English Poets*, in *Works* (ed. Waller and Glover, 1902), 5.47-8.

[3] The German aesthetic doctrine of *Einfühlung*, which was developed by Lotze and subsequently by the school of Wundt, and which received its most thorough exposition in the *Ästhetik* (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1903-6) of Theodor Lipps, emphasized the dissolving of the boundary between the artist and his object, and his identification with it; but it signified less an actual entering into the imaginative object, with the consequent perception of its true nature, than the unconscious attribution to it of qualities and responses known and felt by the imagination itself; the fruition of aesthetic insight, in other words, though accompanied by the merging of the perceiving mind and the perceived object, is largely the by-product of the working of the imagination, projected upon the object. This restriction of *Einfühlung* is extended even more in the strict interpretation of "empathy"—the English equivalent popularized by Vernon Lee (1912), and first supplied by E. B. Titchener (1909), a pupil of Wundt.

[4] See, by the present writer, *Negative Capability: the Intuitive Approach in Keats* (Harvard University Press, 1939), pp. 25-78.

[5] See his excellent Bowdoin Prize Essay, which I hope will not remain long unpublished, on *Hazlitt's Conception of the Poetic Imagination* (Harvard College Library), esp. chs. 2 and 3.

at least cursory reference to the large intuitional school of eighteenth-century British moralists. This group of moralists, especially the Scottish branch of it, is in essence no more than a peculiarly British extension, through Gershom Carmichael and others, of the Scholastic-Grotian natural law tradition, and consequently derives many of its fundamental premises and directions from the long-continued argument against the Epicurean natural law which was half-revived by Laurentius Valla and developed in Britain from George Buchanan to Hobbes; but its immediate impetus, though the influence of Butler grew even stronger as the century progressed, came from Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. As a consequence, though it assumed various names, qualifications, and re-definitions, the instinctive moral faculty of Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's ethics remained; and the close connection established between taste and morality by Shaftesbury, and between the "Moral Sense" and aesthetic "Internal Sense" by Hutcheson, was further stressed by many of their followers. Indicative of this emphasis is the continually reiterated assertion in the criticism of the period that taste and morality are psychologically dependent on each other, that they augment each other's growth and delicacy, and that decline in the one necessarily precipitates decline in the other; for this assertion is less a commonplace in other critics than in those—like Gerard, Ogilvie, Beattie, and Blair—who centered about the Scottish intuitional school of moralists.

Among the earlier moralists of the century, the "sympathetic sense," although recognized as contributing to moral feeling and action, was generally postulated as a faculty distinct from the "moral sense"; but there was an increasing tendency among some writers to associate them more closely. Thomas Nettleton provides a relatively early example of this tendency; Hartley, somewhat later, dwelt upon the associative connection between the two faculties; even Hutcheson, who had earlier spoken slightingly of sympathy as mere selfishness, emphasized the contribution and scope of the "sympathetic sense" in his posthumously published *System of Moral Philosophy* (1755); and Hume, viewing a distinct "moral sense" as a superfluity, in general identified all moral feeling with a kind of "humanity" or "sympathy." Adam Smith, who succeeded to the Glasgow

chair of moral philosophy which Hutcheson had formerly held, accepted the doctrine of sympathy suggested by Hume; and the design of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) is the complete substitution of "sympathy" for the "moral sense" as man's internal monitor, and the elaboration of it as an all-embracing principle of moral feeling and action. Moral judgment, for Smith, involved sympathetic participation with those, other than the agent himself, who would be affected by the external consequences, good or bad, of an act; it necessitated even more an awareness, through sympathy with the agent of the act, both of the "intention or affection of the heart" from which the act proceeds, and of the specific situation, bodily or mental, which helps to prompt that intention.[6] Smith, finally, did not identify his internal monitor with the imagination, but it is significant that he stressed the complete inability of sympathy to function without the aid of the imagination. Thus, he was careful to state at the outset that almost all knowledge of the inner nature and feelings of others must come through the imagination:

> As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did and never can carry us beyond our persons, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. . . . By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation.[7]

Although the followers of Reid, such as Stewart, Adam Ferguson, and John Bruce, mention Smith with respect, and emphasize the significance of sympathy as a contributing though not sole principle of morality, the influence of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* on British moral thought was

[6] Although Smith accentuated the immediate instinctiveness of such sympathetic understanding, and regarded it as divinely implanted, he also recognized the contributing influence of habit and custom in directing sympathy. A certain amount of relativity in sympathetic reaction is bound to accrue; for the varying associations which our "imaginations" attach to phenomena (see pp. 422-3, e. g.; references are to the 2nd ed., 1762), together with the inherent constitution and capacity of the individual nature, determine at least the extent to which sympathy is elicited (p. 16).

[7] P. 2.

hardly profound; it was an influence which was suggestive rather than directing. The recognition of the importance, however, of the imagination in sympathetic understanding is frequently echoed by subsequent Scottish philosophers, as, for example, in Dugald Stewart's assertion that "the apparent coldness and selfishness of mankind may be traced, in a great measure, to a want of attention and a want of imagination";[8] and this recognition is far more strongly present in Scottish literary critics, among whom the book enjoyed a widespread vogue. It is true that the intimate connection between even the terms "sympathy" and "imagination" in eighteenth-century British criticism can hardly be said to date from Smith. James Arbuckle, for example, writing soon after Shaftesbury, had explicitly stated the indispensability of the imagination, which he considered divinely implanted, for sympathetic knowledge of others;[9] Hartley had discussed the associative interrelation of the "Pleasures and Pains of the Imagination" with those of sympathy;[10] and a close follower of Shaftesbury, John Gilbert Cooper, whom Malone called "the last of the *benevolists*" and whom Johnson unfairly dubbed "the Punchinello of literature," had mentioned the "sympathizing Warmth of . . . Imagination."[11] Johnson himself, for that matter, had associated at least the idea of sympathy with the imagination in reiterating his favorite doctrine that only the portrayal of the universally, familiarly known can elicit sympathetic response.[12] The connection established in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, indeed, is hardly more than symptomatic of a growing critical tenet. Yet the book elaborated and in a sense crystallized a fundamental premise of the tenet; and it is of some significance that the development of the sympathetic imagination as an aesthetic doctrine came largely from a group of Scottish critics

[8] *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (Edinburgh, 1792), p. 502.

[9] *Collection of Letters and Essays [Hibernicus's Letters]* (1722), 1. 33-4 (No. 4).

[10] *Observations on Man* (1749), Ch. 4.

[11] *Letters Concerning Taste* (3rd ed., 1757), p. 17.

[12] "All joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination, that realizes the event . . . by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose fortune we contemplate; so that we feel . . . whatever motions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves" (*Rambler*, No. 60, Oct. 13, 1750). Mr. R. D. Havens has pointed out Johnson's use of the word "imagination" in this sense ("Johnson's Distrust of the Imagination," *ELH*, X [1943], 246).

who tended to agree with Archibald Alison's estimate of the *Moral Sentiments* as "the most eloquent work on the subject of Morals that Modern Europe has produced,"[13] and who felt with James Beattie that "the philosophy of Sympathy ought also to form a part of the science of Criticism."[14]

2

A belief in the importance of the poet's "enthusiastic" absorption in his subject, with the resulting obliteration of his own identity, appeared early in eighteenth-century criticism. Shaftesbury, indeed, who was always prone to emphasize the necessity of "enthusiasm," almost anticipates the language of Keats's famous contention that the true poet "has no character . . . no identity," that he is "annihilated" in the characters of others and concerns himself solely with revealing their essential natures, and that he "has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the camelion[15] poet." Shaftesbury, too, extols the poet who knows above all else "the inward form and structure of his fellow creatures," and in the portrayal of them is himself "no certain man, nor has any certain or genuine character," but is "annihilated" in the ebb and flow of the dialogue he presents.[16] It is thus alone, says Shaftesbury, that poetry can reveal its greatest mimetic potentialities. The annihilation, through identification, of any genuine character or identity of his own is a part of the praise of Homer, "the great mimographer"; for

> He describes no qualities or virtues; censures no manners; makes no encomiums . . . 'Tis [the characters] who show themselves. 'Tis they who speak in such a manner as distinguishes them in all things from all others, and makes them ever like themselves. Their dif-

[13] *Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste* (Edinburgh, 1790), p. 390.

[14] "Of Sympathy," *Essays on Poetry and Music, as They Affect the Mind* (1778), p. 194.

[15] *Cf.* Zachary Mayne's statement, though in a somewhat different context, that the imagination is "like the Cameleon, of which Creature it is reported that it changes its Hue according to the Colour of the Place where it happens to be" (*Two Dissertations Concerning Sense and the Imagination* [1728], p. 74). Keats's use of the term as a description of the poetical character was probably suggested, as Mr. Bullitt points out, by Hazlitt.

[16] "Advice to an Authour," *Characteristics* (ed. Robertson, 1900), 1.131-2; 136.

ferent compositions and alloys so justly made, and carried on through every particle of the action, give more instruction than all the comments or glosses in the world. The poet . . . makes hardly any figure at all, and is scarce discoverable in his poem. This is being truly a master . . . A few words let fall on any slight occasion, from any of the parties he introduces, are sufficient to denote their manners and distinct character. From a finger or toe he can represent to our thoughts the frame and fashion of a whole body.[17]

It is true that neo-classic critics usually tend to distinguish sharply between the imagination and the "Passions," and to apply the former to "invention," "arrangement," or "illustration," without any implication of whatever contribution the passions may give. The distinction continued well after the middle of the eighteenth century: thus, even Hugh Blair, who in reality was accustomed to stress the inevitable interplay of feeling and imagination, would define poetry as the language either "of passion, or of enlivened imagination", and the poet's reaction as animation by some object which either "fires his Imagination, or engages his Passions";[18] or Boswell, using the word to denote ease and applicability of metaphor, without implying any stirring of the emotions, would consistently praise the fertility of "imagination" Johnson revealed in conversation or in his moral essays. But among critics who stem from the "moral sense" school, there is an increasing inclination to maintain the connection between imagination and enthusiastic "sensibility," and to assume, at least as far as the arts are concerned, that "in proportion to the degree in which the one takes place, will be always the poignancy and edge of the other."[19] For Shaftesbury and the critics who followed him, extreme "sensibility" and a consequent "enthusiasm" on the part of the poet, whether they were psychologically a part of imaginative action itself or whether they were externally complementary in their working with it, were especially necessary for the complete self-absorption of the poet in the object of his

[17] 1. 129-30.

[18] *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1783), 1. 312; or *cf.* the characteristic comparison of Sophocles and Euripides by James Moor in *Essays: Read to a Literary Society* (Glasgow, 1759), pp. 18-9.

[19] John Ogilvie, *Philosophical and Critical Observations on the Nature, Characters, and Various Species of Composition* (1774), 1. 355. *Cf., e. g.,* Alexander Gerard, *Essay on Genius* (1774), pp. 66-9, or Thomas Percival, *Moral and Literary Dissertations* (Warrington, 1784), p. 126.

concern, and for the sympathetic insight which he achieves by means of this absorption. The eighteenth-century principle that the poet, in order to comprehend and represent "nature," must possess above all an extensive knowledge of human nature in its various ramifications is naturally assumed as a necessary qualification for sympathetic understanding. As Beattie, echoing Smith, points out, we sympathize with what we know; and the wider our knowledge and experience, the wider is the scope of our sympathy and the juster and more accurate it is in perceiving the character and significance of its object.[20] Yet the broadest knowledge of mankind in all its moral and mental manifestations would not, Beattie adds, "have enabled Blackmore to paint such a personage as Homer's Achilles, Shakespeare's Othello, or the Satan of Paradise Lost"; for Blackmore was not endowed with that "sensibility" which "must first of all engage him warmly in his subject." "The true poet . . . must not only study nature, and know the reality of things; but he must possess . . . sensibility, to enter with ardent enthusiasm into every part of his subject, so as to transfuse into his work a pathos and energy sufficient to raise corresponding emotions in the reader." Indeed, it is "sensibility" and "enthusiastic delight" which make fruitful and even possible the knowledge won from experience: sensibility rivets the attention; "He best shall paint them" — Beattie quotes from Pope — "who can feel them most"; for "accurate observation" of nature, sustained over any period of time, "is to be expected from those only who take pleasure in it."[21]

In the successful identification of the poet with his object, the necessary qualifications, on the one hand, of instinctive "sensibility" and imaginative fervor, and, on the other, of extensive acquaintance with human nature, are not to be viewed as separate in their use; they together comprise a single intuition, immediate and inevitable in its procedure, but none the less sagacious and informed. The distinctively British yoking of empiricism and intuitionalism, so frequently present

[20] "Of Sympathy," *Essays* (ed. cit.), pp. 198-205.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2, 57, 70. *Cf.* also Beattie's *Dissertations Moral and Critical* (1783), pp. 181-2; or see Gerard, *Essay on Taste* (Edinburgh, 1759), p. 86, and *Essay on Genius* (ed. cit.), p. 172; Lord Kames, *Elements of Criticism* (Edinburgh, 1762), 2. 149-54; Blair, *Lectures*, 2. 507-8.

in the whole of British philosophy, is particularly manifest in the intuitional moralists of this century: just as empirical data are a meaningless chaos without the shaping and coördination, the unifying direction of intuition, so instinctive insight, though immediate in its action, works through the particular, the empirically known, and is progressively broadened, refined, and molded by knowledge and experience. This psychological assumption of the moralists also underlies much of the English criticism of the later eighteenth century;[22] and it is especially a basic premise for the critics who are concerned with instinctive sympathetic understanding. Thus Joseph Priestley, though he considers the sympathetic function of the imagination to be based upon empirically "mechanical" associations, regards it as instinctive and universally "natural to the human mind"; indeed,

> since the mind perceives, and is conscious of nothing, but the ideas that are present to it, it must, as it were, *conform* itself to them . . .
>
> This takes place so instantaneously and mechanically, that no person whatever hath reflection . . . to be upon his guard against some of the most useless and ridiculous effects of it. What person, if he saw another upon a precipice and in danger of falling, could help starting back, and throwing himself into the same posture as he would do if he himself were going to fall? At least he would have a strong propensity to do it. . . . The more vivid are a man's ideas, and the greater is his sensibility, the more intirely, and with the greater facility, doth he adapt himself to the situations he is viewing.[23]

John Ogilvie, again, does not make the faculty of self-identification rest solely upon "exquisite sensibility" united with

[22] The most prominent instance is perhaps the opening of Sir Joshua Reynolds's Discourse XIII (1786): The "truth" of the imagination is attained by an inherent "sagacity" which "supersedes" reason, and "does not wait for the slow progress of deduction, but goes at once, by what appears a kind of intuition, to the conclusion": yet this intuitive action, Reynolds adds,—in terms which suggest Newman's definition of the "illative sense"—is schooled and enlarged by the unity of "very many and very intricate considerations," too subtle to avail individually in rational analysis and inference, but which, joined together, form and guide the intuition of which they are indeed a part. It is for this reason, according to Reynolds, that the arts, which should be free from "principles falsely called rational," address themselves "only to two faculties of the mind, its imagination and its sensibility," and that in the informed and disciplined "imagination" is the final "residence of truth." (*Discourses* [ed. Dobson, 1907], pp. 195-6.) *Cf.* Johnson's definition of "Good Sense" as "a prompt and *intuitive* perception" (*Life of Pope*, *Lives* [ed. Hill, 1905], 3.216).

[23] *Lectures on Oratory and Criticism* (1777), pp. 126-7; *cf.* p. 109.

"the most copious imagination"; there must also be "deep penetration," grounded upon "experience." This union, which is basically one of "understanding and imagination," comprises the faculty of "discernment," by which means the poet

> becomes capable of entering deeply into the characters of those with whom he is conversant. He gains a facility of reading in the countenance those sensations, however closely concealed, that actuate the heart; and of collecting from casual, loose, and unsupported assertions thrown out apparently at random, as hints of what might have been advanced, such significant and distinguishing criteria as are decisive of their justness, propriety, and importance.[24]

But "discernment," whatever the elements that constitute it, is a single and integrated intuition: in seizing upon the interior workings of the mind and feeling of the person it enters, it follows them "through all their windings, and the effects arising from each, however complicated," with instinctive immediacy, "not by advancing regularly from one object to another," as the reason would do, or "by considering separately each particular part, however necessary to constitute a whole."[25]

Perhaps the most insistent stress on the intuitive nature of the imagination's following of the passions, through a kind of sympathetic sensibility, came from Alexander Gerard. In his *Essay on Taste* (1759), published the same year as Smith's *Moral Sentiments*, Gerard spoke of an instinctive "sensibility of heart," by means of which, in poetry and drama, "we become interested for some of the persons represented, and sympathize with every change in their condition." For this faculty prepares the observer "for readily catching, as by infection, any passion"; "the force of *sympathy* . . . enlivens our *ideas* of the passions infused by it to such a pitch, as in a manner converts them to the passions themselves."[26] These passions, raised in

[24] *Philosophical and Critical Observations* (ed. cit.), 1.178, 282-3. Such discernment is indispensable to the true critic as well, whose mind is "characterized by no circumstance more remarkably than its power of entering into a character when supplied with slight materials, and such as an ordinary mind would wholly overlook. . . . Thus it is that a discerning critic, attentive to the first dawning of genius, will discover in a few loose thoughts thrown out without much connection, the characters of an accurate or comprehensive understanding; and from a few strokes in the same manner of pathos or of description, will judge of the future extent, fertility, and even of the characteristical bias of imagination" (1.220-1).

[25] 1.252-3, 257, 297n.-301n.

[26] Pp. 75, 86, 169-70. *Cf.* James Harris, *Three Treatises* (1744), p. 96; or George Campbell's later argument that "Sympathy is not a passion, but that quality of

the beholder by the sympathetic observation of the passions of others, in turn catch and dominate his imagination, the performance of which is then comparable to that of a magnetic field:

> As the magnet selects from a quantity of matter the ferruginous particles, which happen to be scattered through it, without making an impression on other substances; so imagination, by a similar sympathy, equally inexplicable, draws out from the whole compass of nature such ideas as we have occasion for, without attending to any others.[27]

Gerard expanded this contention in his later *Essay on Genius* (1774): The creative imagination, under the influence of a passion prompted in the poet by sympathetic identification, comprehends and then fuses into a concrete totality all that gives birth to that passion and serves as vent to it. Thus there are

> some ideas intimately connected with a passion, as the object of the passion, its cause, what is fit for supporting it, or what gratifies it. Every passion has a strong tendency to suggest such ideas, to force them into our view . . . An angry man, for example, can scarce avoid thinking of the person who offended him, and of the injury he has done him, recollecting everything he can dishonourable to that person . . . and in a word dwelling on the conception of everything immediately relating to his anger.[28]

In this state, as the sympathetic poet will understand and portray, "the most distant hint is sufficient to direct the imagination to an object which is congruous to the present disposition of mind. We have a very natural and strong presentation of this in Lear's grief and indignation"; and Gerard instances Lear's exclamations, "Didst thou give all to thy daughters, and art thou come to this?" and "What! have his daughters brought him to this pass?" "Abruptness of thought," moreover, tends to characterize the progress of every passion when a sufficiently high pitch is attained; and this the imagination, controlled by the passion with which it has been sympathetically "infected," will appreciate and reveal; for "different

the soul which renders it susceptible of almost any passion" (*Philosophy of Rhetoric* [1776], 1. 320).

[27] Pp. 173-4; *cf.* Akenside's earlier use of the same simile in *The Pleasures of the Imagination* (1744), 3. 312-47.

[28] Pp. 150-1.

ideas being connected with the passion, in different respects, but with almost equal closeness," the passion introduces them with inevitable naturalness. An example of this verisimilitude would be Shakespeare's comprehension and portrayal of Sebastian's fear and grief at the prospect of shipwreck:

> —Mercy on us!
> We split, we split!—farewell, my wife and children!—
> Farewell, brother!—we split, we split, we split![29]

But if the result of the control of the imagination by a passion is "comprehensiveness"—a "comprehensiveness" manifested not by the bulk of illustration and sentiment amassed but by the variety and scope which characterize the imagination's reach—the actual number of ideas culled from this wide extent is determined, with severe economy, by the naturalness of their relevance. When the imagination is under the domination of a passion which it has sympathetically caught, "the passion directs the view to things closely connected with it, so powerfully and so constantly, that the imagination is drawn backwards to repeated conceptions of them"; it engrosses us wholly in the present subject, and "preserves us from attending to foreign ideas, which would confound our thoughts and retard our progress"; and when an object is brought into the mind by a passion to which it is related,

> it receives a tincture from that passion, it exerts its power of association only in such ways and so far as the passion permits it, . . . it introduces no long train of ideas, but suffers the mind to return quickly to the conception of itself, or of some other object as intimately related to the passion. . . . But it has no tendency . . . to lead the imagination into a remote or extensive wandering.[30]

This riveting of the imagination to its object by a passionate identification with it, whereby automatically those ideas alone are admitted which have strict and natural relevance to a passion, constitutes "regularity"; and the process of attaining

[29] Pp. 152-4. Sebastion's "passion," states Gerard, "leads him to think of himself, its most immediate object; but without suffering him to rest a moment on this, it hurries him on to a conception of the cause of his passion, the splitting of the ship; it allows him to make a very short stop there . . . It suffers him not to think of anything that has not an intimate relation to himself, and it makes his imagination to vibrate between those which have such relation." (*Cf.* Ogilvie, *Philosophical and Critical Observations*, 2. 330-1, or Priestley, *Lectures*, pp. 98-100.)

[30] Pp. 69, 165-6, 170-1.

this "regularity" is one of intuition. Almost "as acuteness of smell carries a dog along the path of the game . . . so this happy structure of imagination" proceeds by an "instinctive infallibility" which prevents the poet "from turning aside to wander in improper roads."[31]

3

When the imagination is not dominated by a passion and hence not absorbed in the particular object before him, the poet tends, says Gerard, to become a "spectator," and to give not "a natural *representation* of the passion, but a laboured *description* of it"; "a just representation . . . can be accomplished only by following those paths into which the passions naturally direct the thoughts."[32] The contrast Gerard draws between "representation," as the result of identification, and "description," as the inevitable effect of dispassionate observation, is stated by other Scottish critics as well. Lord Kames,[33] for example, reiterates the common decorum of the period that, in the epic or the poetic drama, a passion "must be adjusted to the character, the sentiments, to the passion, and the language to the sentiments." A wealth of knowledge about the interrelation of character, passion, sentiments, and language, "considered abstractly, will not alone enable an artist to make a just representation of nature": in order to accomplish this end, he must

> be able to adopt every different character introduced in his work. But a very humble flight of the imagination may serve to convert a writer into a spectator. . . . Our sympathy is not raised by description . . . It is this imperfection, I am persuaded, in the bulk of our plays, that confines our stage almost entirely to Shakespeare . . .[34]

[31] Pp. 46-7.

[32] "Of the Influence of the Passions on Association," *Essay on Genius*, pp. 149, 169.

[33] It is of some significance that, while Kames had to a slight extent anticipated Smith in regarding the "principle of sympathy" as "the cement of human society" (*Essays on the Principles of Moral and Natural Religion* [Edinburgh, 1751], p. 24), the influence of Smith is strong in the *Elements of Criticism* (1762), published three years after the *Moral Sentiments* had appeared. Kames here expanded the moral implications of his earlier statement; he also dwelt upon the aesthetic implications of sympathy, instancing its intuitional nature, its dependence upon sensibility, and its importance as a qualification for the poetic imagination, especially in the writing of the epic or the drama.

[34] *Elements*, 2. 149-55.

Blair, again, states that any true representation which might arouse sympathy in the reader or hearer necessitates the use of the "*natural* language of passion"; and that the successful employment of this language requires from the poet "the power of entering deeply into the character he draws, of becoming for a moment the very person whom he exhibits, and of assuming all his feelings . . . There is no possibility of speaking properly the language of any passion without feeling it."[35] Ogilvie, who considered sympathetic "discernment" as an attribute of "those authors who will always stand in the highest rank of eminence," seems to regard characters of Shakespeare and, on one occasion, Fielding's Parson Adams, as instances of its success; but his chief praise is reserved for Homer, with whom he unfavorably contrasts Virgil.[36] As later among romantic critics, however, Shakespeare is usually esteemed as the outstanding example of the power of entering an object of contemplation, and of "representing" rather than "describing." Margaret Cavendish had long since written suggestively of Shakespeare's ability to "metamorphose" himself into his characters.[37] Kames implies the same ability in maintaining Shakespeare's superiority to any other writer "in moulding every passion to peculiarity of character, in discovering the sentiments that proceed from various tones of passion, or in expressing properly every different sentiment."[38] Shakespeare's expressions, states Elizabeth Montagu in an essay which elicited the praise of Beattie and others of his group, reveal

> the internal state of the persons interested, and never fail to command our sympathy. Shakespear seems to have had the art of the Dervise, in the Arabian tales, to throw his soul into the body of another man, and be at once possessed of his sentiments, adopt his passions, and rise to all the functions and feelings of his situation.[39]

Beattie, indeed, employs Shakespeare's ability to identify himself with his characters as an argument for Shakespeare's use of the mixed drama: in addition to the "probability" of comic

[35] *Lectures*, 2. 507-8, 524-5.
[36] *Philosophical and Critical Observations*, 1. 161n.-2n., 163-4, 283.
[37] *CCXI Sociable Letters* (1664), No. 123, pp. 144-9.
[38] *Elements*, 2. 212; *cf.* Blair, *Lectures*, 1. 40; 2. 524-5.
[39] *Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespear* (1769), p. 37.

admixture, so potent is Shakespeare's sympathetic ability that, if his tragedies were uniform, "no person of sensibility would have been able to support the representation."[40]

Departure from strict representation may be twofold. The "indifferent poet" may use expressions which, to quote Blair, are "feeble and general" and fail to "particularize the object"; "we can conceive nothing clearly in the abstract; all distinct ideas are formed upon particulars";[41] and much of English poetry since the Restoration, especially in the drama and the pastoral, is regarded by these critics as typical of this failure. Indicative would be the passages which Blair cites from Congreve's *Mourning Bride*, Rowe's *Jane Shore*, and Addison's *Cato* as examples of the writers' inability to "enter deeply into the characters," and of their consequent use of the dialogue as a means of "describing" the passions of their characters rather than "representing" them.[42] A more likely departure in a poet of genuine talent is that, whatever the particularity of his language, he may still, Gerard states, approach his central object analytically, "abstractly," and from the standpoint of a "spectator":[43] he may view it from innumerable positions, but they will all be exterior, as it were, to the object; he will rather dissectingly and dispassionately note, through successive association, whatever ideas "wit" may suggest; and the connections he detects will be somewhat separated into their component parts. The act of *representation* will be the reverse of the exercise of wit; for the majority of the Scottish critics of this period agree with Kames that "wit consists chiefly in joining things by distant and fanciful

[40] "Of Sympathy," *Essays*, pp. 203-4. For Beattie, to some extent anticipating Bergson's thesis that the comic is incongruity viewed without sympathetic concern but with a kind of momentary anesthesia of the heart, seems to consider comedy as "contrariety" of relations observed from an angle sufficiently removed to forbid strong emotion (pp. 416-54); and sympathy would elicit such an emotion.

[41] *Lectures*, 2. 371-2.

[42] 2. 508-10. *Cf.* Ogilvie's discussion of *Hamlet* and *Cato*, *Philosophical and Critical Observations*, 2. 293-4.

[43] ". . . He goes on coolly imagining such ideas as it suggests by means of any of the principles of association; and he makes the person possessed by the passion to express all these ideas. He feels not the passion, he has not force of genius or sensibility of heart sufficient for conceiving how it would affect a person who felt it, or for entering into the sentiments which it would produce in him" (*Essay on Genius*, p. 172).

relations, which surprise because they are unexpected";[44] and, in such a conception, wit implies less the expression of sympathetic identification than the speculation of an observer. Indeed, the frequent discussions by these critics of the "metaphysical" poets, especially Cowley, have a connection with this attitude: however shrewd and discerning their observations may be, the "metaphysical" poets tend to analyze and speculate, not to represent; and Johnson's statement that they "wrote rather as beholders than partakers of human nature" is somewhat anticipated and later fervently echoed by this group of critics.

The critical premium of this appproach, then, which is restated and extended in romantic criticism, is upon the verisimilitude of the particular rather than upon the dispassionately analytical and informative. The placing of the premium is not, for these critics, a matter of taste or inclination, but is dictated by moral and psychological principles which were especially current in British eighteenth-century philosophy and criticism: Such principles would include the premises, for example, that human nature is the most essential part of "nature"; that, whether it comprises the fundamental impulse of morality or not, and in however varying a degree it may exist among individuals, there is a natural and instinctive sympathy for one's fellow man; that we sympathize with what we see rather than with what we hear intellectually delineated; and that, because of its primary importance in the constitution of man, identification by sympathy, which is achieved through the imagination, characterizes the highest moral and aesthetic exertion—nothing, indeed, "can give lasting delight to a moral being, but that which awakens sympathy."[45] The peculiarly British conception that intuition is directed to the concrete, and attains insight by means of the empirically known, assists in the direction of these principles; symptomatic is the increasingly repeated assertion in the second half of the century that, while the province of the intellect is the general and the abstract, the particular, upon which the imagination is focussed, and to which "alone are the strongest sensations and emotions

[44] *Elements*, 1. 28; *cf.* 2. 58-80.
[45] Beattie, *Essays*, p. 277.

annexed,"[46] is the concern of poetry. In its conception and representation of the particular, however, the imagination, since momentary reactions are only partial explanations of a character, is not confined to the present: sentiments, associations, and motives will depend on the state of mind previous to them,[47] and this "fluctuation of mind" the sympathetic imagination will grasp and present; in its portrayal of distress, for example, it will suggest "such circumstances of former prosperity as aggravate the present distress"[48] — for this aggravation is a part of the distinctive nature of the distress as it now is; the poetic imagination will "blend" together the past and present,[49] and perceive and exhibit the natural outlets, however small, which a passion will take, and "the influence of habit, prepossession, . . . and such other causes as contribute to form a variety of minds particularly investigated."[50] And just as the imagination, which is instinctive in its procedure but developed by knowledge and experience, detects these aspects and disclosures of character, not piecemeal through speculation, but as being *in* the object with which it has identified itself, so in its depiction of them it does not anatomize and describe them individually, but fuses them into the concrete totality about which they center, and presents the particular with the various ramifications and fluctuations of its nature impressed, as it were, upon it.

4

The eighteenth-century British pronouncement of the doctrine of the sympathetic imagination is not, as was earlier stated, to be confused with the recent term "empathy":[51]

[46] Priestley, *Lectures*, p. 84; a concern with the particular is one of the leading merits of Shakespeare (pp. 84-6). The contention that the proper object of poetry and the imagination is the particular was, of course, anything but new. It was simply more frequent, and is indeed a commonplace statement in all the members of the Scottish school and the critics, such as Ogilvie, George Campbell, and Beattie, who emanated from them.

[47] See, *e. g.*, Priestley, *ibid.*, pp. 98-100.

[48] Gerard, *Essay on Genius*, p. 172.

[49] Alison, *Essays* (ed. cit.), pp. 91-3.

[50] Ogilvie, *Philosophical and Critical Observations*, 1. 262-3; *cf.* Beattie, *Essays*, p. 96, or Gerard, *Essays on Genius*, 150-1, 340-1.

[51] See above, n. 3.

the objects of sympathetic understanding are human beings, and generally do not include inanimate objects or sheer aesthetic form as such; and the act of identification, moreover, consists not in reading into the object subjective feelings aroused by it in the observer, but in perceiving, by instinctive but sagacious insight, the essential character and reality of the object itself. Yet vaguely stemming from this notion of sympathetic identification, and by no means clearly distinguished from it, are several implications, at least, of an assumed conception that closely resembles that of empathy. It is given no marked connection with the sympathetic imagination before the second decade of the following century; whatever significance it may have in eighteenth-century criticism, moreover,—and it is not large—consists chiefly in its affinities with contemporary theories about the associational reaction of the imagination to the beautiful and especially the sublime. In conclusion here, however, brief mention of a few of the implications of its presence may be given.

The British associationists of the second half of the eighteenth century were accustomed to presuppose a rough distinction between associations which were more or less peculiar to the individual and those which were apparently common to human nature in general. Our sympathy for inanimate things, Beattie observed, is "in proportion to the vivacity of the perceptions that excite them"; and for this "a lively conception of their object is necessary." We may have associations with an inanimate thing which will give us a "lively conception" of its significance for us personally: thus, "to lose a staff we have long worn, to see in ruins a house in which we have long lived," may awaken sympathetic feelings.[52] A more potent sympathy for the inanimate is aroused, however, by associations which are more generally distributed among mankind, and which are concerned with form or manner of appearance. Thus Richard Payne Knight sought to explain Greek sculpture, in contrast with Egyptian, as depending largely upon "mental sympathies"; at least as far as western man is concerned, who follows the Greek in many of his aesthetic values, the observer associates certain postures and contours with specific "passions

[52] *Essays on Poetry and Music*, pp. 195, 277.

and dispositions of mind"; through his associations, his sympathies are elicited and read, so to speak, into the original aesthetic form.[53] Again, the Longinian conception of the sublime, which had been frequently repeated during the first half of the eighteenth century, was in part restated and analyzed upon associational principles in answer to Burke's *Sublime and Beautiful*: the sublime, whether grandeur, magnitude, or obscurity contribute to its effects, has above all the general association of power or force, the comprehension of which tends to "dilate and expand the mind, and put its grasp to trial." Through a kind of identification with objects which have the association of power — it is "with their *power* we sympathize"[54] — the consequent "expansion of mind" which takes place in the beholder results in a feeling of "noble pride";[55] the mind, given expanse, finds its own power and that in which it participates combined; for since the mind is conscious only of the ideas that

> are present to it, it must, as it were, *conform* itself to them; and even the idea it hath of its own extent . . . must enlarge or contract with its field of view. . . . From this principle . . . ideas of our *own* greatness, dignity, and importance, are the result of our contemplating large and grand objects. This will be conspicuous when we consider the sublime.[56]

And these feelings of pride, of dignity, of expansion, elicited through identification, are projected upon the object and help to give it the character of sublimity. A probable inference is that this associative participation accrues from the contemplation of even simple form; we have, Kames stated, an inherent and rather empathic "sense of order and arrangement":

[53] *Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste* (2nd ed., 1805), esp. pp. 208-10.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[55] Blair, *Lectures*, 1. 46, 58.
[56] Priestley, *Lectures*, pp. 126-7. *Cf.* William Duff, *Essay on Original Genius* (1767), pp. 151-2: the mind, in the expansion which takes place in contemplating the sublime, "is elevated to a sense of its own greatness and dignity." Something of this result, according to Kames, is found in the identification which ensues in observing some "grand or heroic action": by means of the "sympathetic emotion or virtue" — a faculty which, though it partakes of sympathy, is differentiated from the imaginative exertion of entering into a person and perceiving his distinctive nature and reality—we "feel in ourselves an unusual dignity or character" when we observe such actions, and "become conscious of a boldness and intrepidity beyond ordinary" (*Elements*, 1. 71-2; *cf.* Knight's similar discussion of the Laocoon group, *Inquiry*, pp. 334-5).

"Thinking upon a body in motion, we follow its natural course. The mind falls with a heavy body, descends with a river, and ascends with flame and smoke."[57] Thus, Hogarth's famous "line of beauty"—a serpentine or waving line—is much discussed by the associationists, and given some support by them: slow motion in gentle curves has associations of "Volition and Ease"; in following the curving of the line with the eye and hence, Alison implies, by a kind of joining in with its motion, so to speak, we attribute these same associations to the line itself, and designate it as beautiful. A similar intimation is that the associations of power which come with the extended sweep of rapid motion are carried over to forms which, for example, possess "magnitude in height": this extensive upward rising lifts the mind, it produces a feeling of "Elevation," and we tend to specify the form that initiates the feeling as sublime.[58] The discussion by some of the associationists of the reaction of feeling to sound seems to involve the same assumption of participation: there is a "natural correspondence between movement and passion," and "the imagination may be *raised* by movements of expansion";[59] for feeling itself exists in flux, and the acceleration and deepening of its natural ebb and flow by music or by even a simple sound may perhaps be attributed to the extent to which feeling makes itself specific in the temporal stream and gives itself form and embodiment through a unification with the flow of sound. Thus the rise and fall through time of a "low, grave sound" is beautiful; while in the gradual swelling of a "loud, grave, lengthened, and increasing sound," with its suggestion of power and of "great expansion," the flow of feeling, itself receiving through the participation an embodied expansion and elevation, is such that we characterize the sound as sublime.[60]

The implications of such reactions, in short, perhaps anticipate an assumption of empathy in the sense that qualities are attributed to inanimate objects or to form itself which arise from an identification of sorts, but which are determined not

[57] *Elements*, 1. 29-30.

[58] "Of the Natural Sublimity and Beauty of Forms," pp. 229-30, 235-6, and "Of the Beauty and Sublimity of Motion," pp. 401-9, in *Essays on Taste* (ed. cit.).

[59] Daniel Webb, *Observations on the Correspondence between Poetry and Music* (1769), pp. 151, 153.

[60] Alison, "Of Simple Sounds," *Essays*, pp. 175-7; Beattie, *Essays*, pp. 150-1.

by the nature of these phenomena but by the place and character of the qualities in human capacity and resources. It stands opposed, in its subjectivity, to that insight of the sympathetic imagination by which objective understanding of people is achieved. As such, it later underwent a complete reversal; for what position this participative unification with form or with the inanimate has as a tenet in romantic criticism is sympathetic and the opposite of empathic. It is there as much an objective goal for imaginative grasping as the understanding of human beings: it thus rests upon the assumptions, first, that beauty is a sort of by-product attending the fulfillment by a creature, object, or aesthetic form, of its peculiar function, significance, or nature; and, second, that the sympathetic imagination has valid means of perceiving that distinctive character, individuality, and purpose which constitute both the "truth" and beauty of the object of its concern. Yet this reversal by romantic critics, like so many other of their assumptions, was essentially a crystallization and ultimate conclusion of other premises which had been developed in separate directions by the eighteenth-century associationists; but the analysis of these directions must be deferred for subsequent discussion.

Society of Fellows, Harvard University

THE GENESIS OF SOME PASSAGES WHICH SPENSER BORROWED FROM MARLOWE

By T. W. Baldwin

So far as I can see, Mr. Watkins [1] has not found any of my facts incorrect. Nor do the further parallels as yet appear to me to have a bearing on the fundamental problem, which is the relative relationship of Marlowe and Spenser to certain known sources and in consequence to each other. For this is not a problem of merely building something up from an uncontrolled mass of materials. It is a problem of establishing controllable relationships, as definite as determining the stemma of related manuscripts. Parallels as such do not enter into this particular question. It is thus necessary to view the facts in their controlling framework. The same is true of my statements concerning the facts and framework; they are limited by their logical complex and cannot stand alone.

As to the Elizabethans, including Spenser, they will not challenge Mr. Watkins for his insistence in applying his own " modern " concepts of plagiarism and copyright to their fundamental principle of imitation and consequent ideas of what was fair and proper—those Elizabethans have even stolen all our best ideas!—as their predecessors had done to them! But now their swords are rust and they but dust, defenseless.

University of Illinois

[1] Watkins, W. B. C., " The Plagiarist: Spenser or Marlowe? " *ELH* 11 (1944) 249-65.